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Abstract
In this project, I use a mediation analysis to examine how the partisanship of a state
affects how the state implements the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and, as a result,
constituents’ access to health insurance. I construct an annual panel dataset from
2010 to 2015. Controlling for state demographic variables, states with Democrat
governors and legislatures are more likely to implement the Medicaid expansion
component of the law and a state-based exchange. States that implement the
Medicaid expansion experience additional pre to post-ACA decreases in the
uninsured rate and the proportion of people who get their insurance through a
direct purchase and additional increases in the proportion of people covered
through Medicaid than non-expansion states. Partisanship does not have a direct
effect on pre to post-ACA health insurance outcomes changes; any effect
partisanship has strictly comes indirectly through its effect on implementation of
the ACA.
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I. Introduction
Throughout history, there has been a great deal of debate about how much
economic policies differ between Republicans and Democrats. On one hand,
Republicans supposedly tend to prefer lower tax rates, less deficit spending, free
market competition with little government regulation, and less entitlement
spending (Republican National Committee 2017). On the other hand, Democrats are
said to favor more government regulation in the economy, progressive taxation
(higher tax rates for higher income brackets), universal government healthcare, and
greater entitlement spending (Democratic National Committee 2016). Based on
these historical trends, my motivating question for this project is how much does
economic policy actually differ when Democrats are in power versus when
Republicans are? Furthermore, how do these possible differing policies affect
economic outcomes?
For my research, I choose to focus on healthcare, which is one of the most
expensive sectors of the economy. In 2015, the federal government alone spent 1.05
trillion dollars of the nation’s 3.8 trillion dollar federal budget (27.42 percent) on
healthcare. This amount was second only to spending within the category of social
security, unemployment, and labor and was also greater than federal spending on
the next three largest categories—military, interest on debt, and veteran’s
benefits—combined (National Priorities Project 2016). Moreover, adding federal
spending with consumer spending, US total healthcare spending accounted for 17.8
percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015. Total healthcare
spending was equal to 3.2 trillion dollars, which is an average of approximately

6

9,990 dollars per person (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016). Within
the healthcare sector, I choose to examine state-level variation in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). I choose the ACA because although it is a
federal economic policy, states have control over how they choose to implement it.
Each state can decide whether or not it wants to implement the Medicaid expansion
component of the law and what type of state exchange (federally-facilitated, statebased, or partnership) it wants to operate. The specific question I attempt to
answer is how does the executive and legislative partisanship of a state affect how
the state implements the Medicaid expansion and state exchange components of the
law and, as a result, constituents’ access to health insurance?
To begin, the ACA was first passed and signed into law by Barack Obama on
March 23, 2010. The primary goal of the law is to decrease the number of US
citizens who are uninsured. The first way in which the law addresses this goal is by
requiring states to establish and operate exchanges where individuals and small
businesses can purchase health insurance. Although the federal law requires that
states set up these exchanges, it gives each state the authority to choose whether it
wants to implement a federally-facilitated, state-based, or partnership exchange
(McAuliff et al. 2012). All three types of exchanges are required to perform the four
core functions of an exchange, which include overseeing eligibility and enrollment,
plan management, consumer assistance, and financial management. The only
difference between each type is which functions the state’s government performs
and which the federal government performs (Noh and Krane 2016). In a statebased exchange, the state is responsible for performing each of the four functions.
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This means that individual consumers and small business employers and employees
enroll in coverage through marketplace websites that are established and run by the
state. In a federally-facilitated exchange, the US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) performs all four core functions. As a result, individual consumers
and small businesses and their employees must apply for and enroll in coverage
through the federal government’s website, healthcare.gov. A partnership exchange
is a hybrid of the state-based and federally-facilitated exchanges, with the state’s
government performing the plan management and consumer assistance functions
and the federal government performing the financial management, eligibility, and
enrollment functions. Because the federal government performs the eligibility and
enrollment functions, consumers and small business employers and their employees
apply for and enroll in coverage through healthcare.gov (Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation 2017).
The ACA also stipulates that exchanges must offer four types of plans, which
are categorized into metal-tiers. These plans are offered in both the individual and
small business markets. The main difference between each metal-tier is the cost
sharing of the total plan price between the individual and his or her insurance
company. The quality of care is consistent across all plans, as they each provide the
same essential health benefits. In the bronze metal-tier, the insurance company
covers approximately 60 percent, while the individual pays 40 percent of the total
healthcare costs. The insurance company covers approximately 70 percent of the
cost for a silver-tier plan, 80 percent for gold, and 90 percent for platinum. Bronze
plans tend to have a low monthly premium and high costs when individuals need
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care, while gold and platinum plans have a high monthly premium and low costs
when individuals need care. Silver plans have both moderate premiums and
deductibles (Healthcare.gov 2014). Furthermore, catastrophic plans are also
available to certain individuals. Individuals who qualify for this type of plan are
those who are under the age of thirty or those of any age who qualify for a hardship
or affordability exemption from the individual mandate component of the ACA.
Catastrophic plans are only available to individuals, not small businesses. Moreover,
they provide coverage of the same essential health benefits that the metal-tier plans
do in addition to covering three primary care visits for year before an individual has
met his or her deductible (Healthcare.gov 2014).
The second way in which the ACA addresses its goal of reducing the
uninsured rate is through a Medicaid expansion. Medicaid is a federal-state health
insurance program that covers poor individuals of all ages who are unable to afford
their own insurance. It also covers low-income individuals with disabilities
(McAuliff et al. 2012). Prior to the ACA, states had control over eligibility for and
levels of funding put towards the program. When the ACA was first passed in 2010,
however, it required that all states expand their Medicaid programs to provide
coverage to all individuals, including children, pregnant women, parents, and adults
without dependent children, also known as “childless adults,” who are under the age
of 65 and have incomes up to 138 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL).
Childless adults were not eligible for the program prior to its expansion under the
ACA. Moreover, the law stated that if a state did not expand its program, it would
lose all federal Medicaid funding (McAuliff et al. 2012). Many states found it unfair
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that the federal government could take away their Medicaid funding if they did not
expand their Medicaid programs. In fact, 27 states filed or were part of lawsuits that
challenged this component of the law. The legal challenge eventually reached the
Supreme Court in the 2012 case, National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius. The Supreme Court came to the decision that the federal government
could not take away Medicaid funding from states that did not want to expand their
programs. In other words, the Supreme Court’s decision granted states the ability to
choose whether or not they want to implement the Medicaid expansion component
of the law (Noh and Krane 2016).
For my research, I examine the Medicaid expansion and state exchange
components of the ACA because, as mentioned above, they are the two primary
components of the law that states have control over how they choose to implement.
Both components took effect on January 1, 2014. Two other components of the ACA
that are essential, but states do not have control over, are the individual mandate
and premiums and cost-sharing subsidized by tax credits to help low-income
persons obtain insurance. The individual mandate states that all legal residents of
the United States must obtain health insurance. If a person does not obtain
insurance, he or she receives a tax penalty that is based on income. The tax penalty
either ranges from 695 dollars to 2085 dollars per year (it increases as income
increases) or, for high-income earners, is worth 2.5 percent of household income
(Frean Gruber, and Sommers 2016). In Medicaid expansion states, premiums and
cost-sharing subsidized by tax credits are available to individuals who both fall
between 138 and 400 percent of the FPL and purchase their insurance through the
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state’s federally-facilitated, state-based, or partnership exchange. In non-Medicaid
expansion states, premiums and cost-sharing subsidized by tax credits are available
to citizens who both fall between 100 and 400 percent of the FPL and purchase their
insurance through the state’s exchange (Noh and Krane 2016). Tax credit values are
based on the second lowest cost silver plan in the state and are also tied to income.
For example, the tax credit is 2 percent of a person’s income if he or she makes up to
138 percent of the FPL and 9.5 percent if he or she makes between 300 and 400
percent (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 2013).
I begin this paper with a summary and analysis of past literature on
differences in Republican and Democratic economic policy, state-level
implementation of the ACA, and post-ACA health insurance outcomes. I then use a
mediation analysis that allows me to examine my central question: does state
executive and legislative partisanship affect health insurance outcomes?
Completing a mediation analysis allows me to examine how ACA Medicaid
expansion and exchange implementation choices mediate the relationship between
state partisanship and health insurance outcomes. Moreover to complete this
mediation analysis, I break my central question into three parts. First, does state
executive and legislative partisanship affect a state’s implementation of the ACA?
Second, does implementation of the exchange and Medicaid expansion components
of the law affect health insurance outcomes? Third, does partisanship have an
additional effect on changes in pre and post-2014 health insurance outcomes
beyond its influence on the implementation decisions, which then affect health
insurance outcomes?
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I find that both state executive and legislative partisanship affect how a state
implements the exchange and Medicaid expansion components and that
implementation does in fact affect health insurance outcomes. I also find that the
way in which a state implements the two components of the law has a significant
effect on the changes in pre to post-ACA health insurance outcomes. Partisanship
also affects differences in pre and post-ACA health insurance outcomes; however,
this effect that partisanship has only comes through implementation decisions. In
other words, a state’s partisanship affects how the state chooses to implement each
of the two components of the ACA. The way in which the two components of the
ACA are implemented then affects health insurance outcomes. Partisanship does
not have an additional effect on health insurance outcomes beyond its influence on
the implementation decisions, which then affect health insurance outcomes.

II. Literature Review
Throughout this section, I complete an in depth review of several published
studies that relate to my own. These papers examine a variety of topics, including
the influence of political parties on implementation of non-ACA health insurance
programs, the importance of political parties and non-political factors in ACA
implementation, and the effect of ACA implementation on health insurance
outcomes. Before focusing on health insurance and ACA-related studies, however, I
begin my review with two papers that look at how economic policies and outcomes
differ under Democrats and Republicans.
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In his article, “Estimating the Impact of Gubernatorial Partisanship on Policy
Settings and Economic Outcomes: A Regression Discontinuity Approach,” Leigh
(2008) finds that there are few, but still some differences in both economic policy
and outcomes despite whether a governor is Democrat or Republican. For his
research, Leigh (2008) uses panel data from all US states between 1941 and 2002.
He drops the first year of each gubernatorial term from his dataset because policies
do not take effect immediately and often do not have an impact until the following
year after they are implemented. Moreover, he completes an analysis that controls
for state and year fixed effects that could have an impact on the policies and
outcomes he is examining. In this analysis, Leigh (2008) conducts the same five
regressions for each policy or outcome. In all five of the regressions, his dependent
variable is the economic policy or outcome. The three policy and outcome
categories he examines are pure policy variables, such as the minimum wage or tax
rates, outcomes that are a result of both policy choices and economic conditions,
such as expenditure or transfer programs, and welfare variables, such as incomes
and unemployment. His independent variable is the executive partisanship of the
state. This variable is a dummy variable, with one equaling a Democrat governor
and zero equaling an Independent or Republican governor. Regressions one
through four are ordinary least squares regressions.
In the first regression, Leigh (2008) simply includes his dependent variable,
independent variable, and the state and year fixed effects. His second regression is
the first regression plus a variable accounting for time-varying characteristics of the
state. Adding this variable controls for the fact that the demographic characteristics
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of the state could have an effect on the governor’s policy choices or economic
outcomes. The third regression is the second regression plus two measures of
legislative partisanship that control for any partisan affiliation of a governor that
may be correlated with the partisan composition of the legislature. Both legislative
measures are dummy variables, with the first equaling one if Democrats control
both the state’s house and senate in a given year and the second equaling one if
Republicans control both the state’s house and senate in a given year. The fourth
regression is the third regression plus the Poole-Rosenthal score for the state’s
house of representatives. The Poole-Rosenthal score measures the ideology of the
state’s house of representatives, which Leigh (2008) believes is a reflection of the
ideology of the state’s voters and, therefore, can be used to control for state voter
ideology. Finally, the fifth regression is a regression discontinuity estimation. This
estimation is nearly identical to the fourth regression; however, Leigh (2008) drops
states that had non-contested elections from his dataset. Non-contested elections
are defined as elections in which one party won 80 percent or more of the vote or
elections in which one of the top two candidates was an Independent. This allows
him to only examine states that had similar values of the vote share, but different
values of the independent variable, executive partisanship. For example, a state
could have a voter share that is 49 percent to 51 percent in a Republican’s favor or
in a Democrat’s favor. In both cases, the vote share is nearly the same, yet executive
partisanship is completely different.
Leigh (2008) finds that Democrat governors prefer higher minimum wages.
Specifically, the minimum wage is approximately 0.9 percent higher under a
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Democrat governor than under a Republican one. This result was significant in his
first two regressions. He also finds that the fraction of the state population on
welfare is approximately 1 to 2 percent higher under Democrat governors, with this
result being significant in the third and fourth regressions. Third, he finds that
median post-tax incomes are precisely 1 percent higher and post-tax inequality is
1/3 of a Gini point lower under Democrat governors. Both of these results are
significant in the second, third, and fourth regressions. Fourth, using the regression
discontinuity estimation, he finds that Democrats generally preside over lower
unemployment rates, approximately 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points lower than under a
Republican governor, and over slightly lower state revenues. Finally, Leigh (2008)
concludes that tax rates, pre-tax incomes and inequality, and spending policies do
not significantly differ between Republican and Democrat governors.
Similar to Leigh (2008), in his paper “Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes:
Evidence that Political Parties Matter,” Reed (2006) examines the influence of state
partisanship on economic outcomes. In addition to legislative partisanship, Reed
(2006) also includes executive partisanship as an independent variable. For
legislative partisanship, he includes variables for a Democratic legislature and a
Republican legislature, the omitted legislative partisanship variable being when the
legislature is split. For executive partisanship, he includes a variable for a Democrat
governor, the omitted categories being when the governor is Republican or
Independent. Furthermore, instead of focusing on a variety of economic outcomes,
as Leigh (2008) does, Reed (2006) solely uses state tax burdens as his dependent
variable. State tax burdens are the ratio of total state and local tax revenues to state
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personal income. Reed (2006) uses a change in the state’s tax burden as an
indicator of a political party influence on taxes. The data used in the model is statelevel data from 1960 to 2000 for the included 45 states. Alaska and Hawaii are
dropped from the dataset because they are not part of the Contiguous United States,
Nebraska and Minnesota are dropped because they had a unicameral, non-partisan,
legislature for some or all of the time period being examined, and Wyoming is
dropped because there were data collection issues in the composition of its tax
burden variable. Finally, the unit of observation that Reed (2006) uses is state-5year-period. Because Reed (2006) groups his data into five-year periods, the
Democrat legislature and Republican legislature variables are defined as the
percentage of years during the five year period that Democrats or Republicans,
respectively, controlled both chambers of the state legislature. The Democrat
governor variable is defined as the percentage of years during the five-year period
that the state had a Democrat governor. Because economic outcomes are often
reflections of policies implemented in the previous year, all three partisanship
variables are lagged by one year.
Reed (2006) runs four primary regressions; the first two are ordinary least
squares and the other two are two-stage least squares. In all four regressions, he
controls for state and voter characteristic variables, including the percentage of a
state’s population over 65, the percentage of the state’s population who are African
American, the percentage of the state’s population who are female, the percentage of
the state’s citizens who are at least twenty-five and have completed at least a college
degree program, the percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees who
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are union members, the percentage of a state’s personal income attributed to farm
and manufacturing sectors, the ratio of a state’s population to its land area, and the
Americans for Democratic Action variable, which controls for the influence of
voters’ policy preferences on the implementation of public policy by the state’s
federal legislators. These variables are controlled for because past research has
shown that populations that are older, more educated, and more agriculturallybased tend to prefer lower taxes, while populations that are more urban, unionized,
and have greater percentages of African Americans and females prefer higher ones.
He also controls for the initial tax burden at the beginning of the five-year period
being examined and each regression includes state and time fixed effects. He
includes these fixed effects because state tax burdens showed cyclical behavior over
his sample period. Similar to the partisanship variables, all control variables are
lagged by one year.
In one of the ordinary least squares regressions and one of the two-stage
least squares regressions, Reed (2006) also controls for omitted variable bias by
including interactive time effects for the following state and voter characteristic
variables: percent union, population density, farm share, and the initial tax burden.
Reed (2006) chooses this combination of variables because using these specific
variables in his regression gives him the best regression according to the Akaike
Information Criterion score, a score that measures the relative quality of several
specifications for a given dataset. Finally, Reed (2006) chooses to use two-stage
least squares regressions in addition to the ordinary least squares regressions to
address the potential confound of endogenety, which means that an independent
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variable could be correlated with the dependent variable’s error terms in the
specification. Reed (2006) believes that the variables that could be endogenous in
his regression are: percent elderly, percent female, percent black, percent collegeeducated, percent union, population density, log of real per capita personal income,
farm share, and manufacturing share. In the two-stage least squares regressions,
each endogenous variable’s instrument is the initial value the variable takes at the
beginning of the 5-year subset of data being examined. For example, if Reed (2006)
is examining the time period of 1960 to 1965, the instrument variable for percent
elderly is the value of percent elderly in 1960.
All four regressions lead Reed (2006) to conclude that political parties have a
significant impact on state tax policy. State tax burdens are greater under
Democrats. Moreover, the two-stage least squares regressions indicate an even
larger increase in state tax burdens under Democrats and a greater decrease in state
tax burdens under Republicans than the ordinary least squares regressions do.
Specifically, the two-stage least squares regression with the interactive variables
yields the result that tax burdens are approximately 0.315 to 0.542 percentage
points higher when Democrats control the state legislature. Finally, he finds that the
political party of the governor has little effect on tax burdens. He hypothesizes that
this is the case because each state’s governor has to satisfy the policy preferences of
his or her state’s median voter, whereas each legislator only needs to satisfy the
median voter in his or her respective district, which could be more polarized than
the entire state itself.
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Focusing more specifically on health insurance, several studies looking at
how political parties influence various degrees of health insurance program
implementation have been completed. In their article, “The Social Environment and
Medicaid Expenditures: Factors Influencing the level of State Medicaid Spending,”
Buchanan, Cappelleri, and Ohsfeldt (1991) use data for 47 states between 1977 and
1987 to create a two-stage least squares model. Their model examines how a
variety of economic, political, and administrative factors affect state Medicaid
expenditures in each of the years being examined. The factors examined for each
state include personal income per capita in terms of real 1967 dollars, a liberal
index used to measure the state’s political alignment, an index used to measure the
state’s political competition, the number of patients’ care physicians per 1000
persons, the percentage of Medicaid expenditures paid for by the federal
government, the previous year’s Medicaid expenditures, the number of Medicaid
recipients, and a variable that reflects which level of government (state or local) is
administering the Medicaid program. The authors hypothesize that states with
higher per capita incomes, greater political competition, a greater number of
physicians per 1000 persons, higher numbers of Medicaid recipients, and higher
Medicaid expenditures in the previous year will all have higher Medicaid
expenditures in the present year. They also predict that Medicaid expenditures will
be higher in states that have a greater percentage of their Medicaid expenditures
being paid by the federal government and are more liberal.
One issue with the variables being used in the model is that one of the
independent variables, the previous year’s Medicaid expenditures, is the same
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variable as the dependent variable, the only difference being that it is lagged by one
year. In other words, the independent variable is Medicaid expenditures at time t-1
and the dependent variable is Medicaid expenditures at time t. The authors choose
to use a two-stage least squares model because it can address this issue. In the first
stage, the authors create an instrumental variable by regressing the log of the
dependent variable (Medicaid expenditures at time t) on all of the independent
variables. In the second stage of the regression, this new instrumental variable,
which is the predicted value of log expenditures lagged by one year, is used instead
of the original independent variable and the equation is re-estimated using ordinary
least squares.
The authors find that economic factors have the greatest influence on how
much the state spends on Medicaid. As real personal income per capita increases,
the real dollar amount of the current year’s Medicaid expenditures also increases.
In other words, wealthier states spend more on Medicaid than poor states do.
Moreover, as the real dollar amount of Medicaid expenditures for the previous year
increases, so does the real dollar amount of Medicaid expenditures for the current
year. Second, the authors find that implementation factors have the second greatest
influence. States who administer their Medicaid programs through local-level
governments spend more on the program than those that administer the Medicaid
program through the state-level government. Finally, Buchanan, Cappelleri, and
Ohsfeldt (1991) find that there is not a relationship between the liberal ideology
index and Medicaid spending, meaning that more liberal states are not necessarily
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more likely to spend more on Medicaid. They find the same type of results for the
relationship between interparty competition and Medicaid spending.
Similarly, Daniel Tope and Lisa N. Hickman (2012) look at which factors
influence how a state implements, and how much a state spends on the Children’s
Health Insurance Policy (CHIP) in “The Politics of Children’s Health Insurance
Policy.” As Tope and Hickman (2012) explain, CHIP was passed as part of the
federal Balanced Budget Act of 1997. It mandated that states create medical
insurance programs to cover children who would not otherwise be able to receive
insurance. Similar to the ACA, CHIP is a federally sponsored program, with state
leaders being given control over how they want to implement it. This means that
they can choose how much they want to spend, what children qualify, and what
resources are allocated towards the program. Tope and Hickman (2012)
hypothesize that political factors, fiscal capacity, bureaucratic development, prior
policy spending, and race composition can influence how the state implements
CHIP.
To examine their question, the authors use a panel data set with data from
1998 to 2008, where their unit of analysis is one of 48 states—they exclude Hawaii
and Alaska—in one of the given years. They run their analysis using two
regressions. The first regression they run is a simple linear regression with panelcorrelated standard errors. The second regression is an ordinary least squares with
random effects. They primarily use this second regression as a robustness test. To
measure political factors, the authors use a dummy variable equaling one if the
governor of the state is a Republican and zero otherwise; they also measure the
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percentage of Republicans in each state legislature. To measure fiscal capacity, state
debt is divided by tax revenue for each year. To measure bureaucratic development,
the authors use a ten-point scale for each component of a state’s development of the
program: compensation level, time in session, and staff size. To measure prior
policies, a policy legacy indicator of “best case” states for welfare policy
development is used. The authors use the percentage of African Americans and
Hispanics in each state to measure the influence of the state’s racial and ethnic
composition. Finally, the authors control for several variables, including the ratio of
the number of uninsured children to the total population, the ideological leanings of
state populations, and the median age of the state population.
Using both regressions, which produced similar results, Tope and Hickman
(2012) find that having a Republican governor and legislature, higher African
American population, and older population each decrease CHIP spending. On the
other hand, they find that professionalized state legislatures, higher financial
capacities, and prior welfare spending each increase CHIP spending. Moreover, they
conclude that state legislatures that are more developed or bureaucratized are
better equipped to study and develop policy, therefore increasing CHIP spending.
Finally, they find that the more uninsured children a state has, the more likely it is to
spend on CHIP.
Along with articles that study how political parties influence general health
insurance policies, there have also been several studies that examine how political
parties influence ACA implementation. In their article “The Politics of Need:
Examining Governors’ Decisions to Oppose the ‘Obamacare’ Medicaid Expansion,”
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Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) examine the Medicaid expansion component of the
ACA. The authors hypothesize that political ideology, state economic conditions,
public opinion of the ACA, and the needs of citizens are all factors in determining
whether a governor decides to enact the Medicaid expansion component. To test
their hypothesis, Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) use data from 2012 to 2014 for all
50 states and a logistic regression model. In the model, the independent variables
for each state are the partisanship of the governor (a dummy variable where a
Republican governor equals one is used), the partisanship of the legislature (a
dummy variable that equals one if the legislature is controlled by Republicans is
used), the estimated percentage of the population that has a favorable view of the
ACA, the percentage of the state’s population that is uninsured, and
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments to hospitals. DSH payments are
federally required payments that state Medicaid programs make to hospitals that
primarily treat either individuals who are uninsured or insured through Medicaid.
The dependent variable is the state’s executive opposition to the Medicare
expansion, with executive opposition equaling one if the governor opposes the
Medicaid expansion. Four primary state-level control variables are also used in the
model, including the percentage of African Americans and the percentage of the
population living in a metropolitan area. Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014) explain that
both of these controls are included because non-whites and people living in cities
are more likely to enroll in Medicaid. The third control included is the measure of
the state’s fiscal health, and, therefore, ability to pay for Medicaid. This is equal to
the ratio of the state’s year-end reserves to their total spending. The final control is
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the state’s current Medicaid multiplier, which is used to measure the attractiveness
of the new Medicaid funds that would come from implementing the Medicaid
expansion relative to the current rate of funds the state is putting towards the
program.
The authors find that a governor’s partisanship and state legislative control
each have a larger effect on a state’s decision to oppose the Medicaid expansion than
the effects the needs of citizens, public opinion, or state economic conditions do.
Having a Republican governor increases the probability of executive opposition by
49 percentage points, and having a Republican legislature in a state with a
Republican governor increases the chance of executive opposition by 36 percentage
points. In states that have Democrat legislatures, having a Republican governor
increases the chance of executive opposition by approximately 9 percentage points.
Public opinion of the ACA and measures of need, including urbanization, DSH
payments to hospitals, and the percentage of the population that is uninsured, do
not have a significant effect on a governor’s decision to oppose the Medicaid
expansion.
In a similar study to that of Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014), Rigby (2012)
examines whether political or economic factors play more of a role in determining
the degree to which a state will resist the ACA in her article, “State Resistance to
‘ObamaCare.’” She also focuses on the Medicaid expansion component of the law.
To begin, Rigby explains that there are three ways in which a state can resist
implementing the law: through filing a lawsuit that challenges it, implementing
legislation that opposes it, or rejecting federal implementation funds. Using state-
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level data from 2010 and 2011, she constructs a state resistance index that gives
each state a rating from zero to three, depending on how many of the measures the
state took to resist the law. Rigby (2012) then uses a multivariate logistic
regression model to compare the reasons for state resistance to the Medicaid
expansion. First, she uses an ordered logit regression to predict how several
predictors affect the probability of each level of resistance. One regression is run for
each predictor. The predictor used to measure public opinion is the percentage of
the public opposed to the expansion. To measure party control, the predictors are
the percentage of the legislature that is Republican and whether or not the governor
is a Republican. Legislative professionalism, per capita income, and budgetary
shortfalls are each predictors used to measure state capacity. Medicaid enrollment
increases, the cost of a Medicaid increase, reductions in the percentage of people
uninsured, and uncompensated care savings are each predictors used to measure
the magnitude of a policy change. After running one regression for each individual
predictor, she then runs another regression, which includes all ten of the predictor
variables together.
Similar to Barrilleaux and Rainey (2014), Rigby (2012) finds that the most
influential factor in determining whether a state resists the ACA is the partisanship
of the state. She also finds that both the state’s legislative and executive branches
are influential in determining whether a state resists the ACA. If Republicans
control at least one of the two branches, then the state is more likely to resist the
ACA. Finally, she finds that both public opinion and economic factors do not affect a
state’s resistance.
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In a similar project completed two years later, Rigby and Haselswerdt (2014)
instead look at the state health insurance exchange component of the law and
attempt to determine whether economic, ideological, or partisan factors play the
largest role in determining how and when a state implements a state health
insurance exchange. They first explain that there are three steps a state can take to
show that they will establish a state exchange: they can express their intentions in
an application for a federal exchange establishment grant, declare their intent to
establish, or submit a blueprint to the federal government requesting certification of
a state-based or a partnership exchange. Using data on each state’s progress in
establishing a health insurance exchange between March 2011 and December 2012,
the authors run a conditional risk-set duration model. This model helps them to
determine the likelihood of a particular state, at a particular time point, moving to a
higher level of implementation of one of the three types of exchanges (federallyfacilitated, state-based, or partnership), which is signified by the state taking one of
the aforementioned three steps. This model is based on the assumption that if a
state takes one of these three steps to establish an exchange, then the state supports
the ACA.
Rigby and Haselswerdt (2014) find that ideological and partisan factors play
the largest role in determining how a state implements the exchange component of
the law. Moreover, they find that liberal states, meaning those with a Democrat
governor and Democrat legislature, will generally agree with the policy objectives of
the ACA and will choose to implement their own state-based health exchanges
instead of a partnership or federally-facilitated one. On the other hand,
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conservative states will avoid implementation, eventually establishing their own
exchanges to maintain policy autonomy and avoid the consequence of having the
federal government step in to establish a federally-run exchange.
In another project that examines the state exchange component of the law,
Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander (2013) examine the decision-making process that
states with Republican governors went through when deciding whether or not to
implement an exchange during the time when the exchange component of the law
was under debate in the Supreme Court in 2012. The authors determine that
Republicans face a dilemma when deciding whether or not to implement an
exchange because they want to maintain policy autonomy, which would be
accomplished through implementing an exchange, but they do not want to give into
a law they oppose. Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander (2013) compare this dilemma to
Pascal’s Wager.
Pascal’s Wager is an idea proposed by seventeenth-century philosopher
Blaise Pascal. It states that when a person is uncertain as to whether or not God
exists, the safest way to live is by assuming that God is real and that he will judge
you in the afterlife. The way in which Republicans dealt with dilemma of whether or
not to implement an exchange before the exchange component of the law was
upheld by the Supreme Court is similar to Pascal’s Wager because a large part of the
dilemma was based on whether or not Republican states believed the exchange
component of the law would survive. Some Republicans took the same approach as
suggested by Pascal in his Wager, meaning that they assumed that the law would
stand and its deadlines would be enforced, just as Pascal assumed that God existed
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and would judge one in the afterlife. Others, however, decided to interpret the law
as if it did not exist.
Instead of using an econometric model, as seen in similar projects, Jones,
Bradley, and Oberlander (2013) solely examine Republican-governed states. In
each state they examine, they conduct interviews between June 2011 and February
2013 with state policy makers and leaders. They find that a state’s decision to
implement the state-based exchange did not depend on which political party was
governing the state, as Rigby and Haselswerdt (2014) found. Instead, they find that
a state’s decision depended on whether it thought the Supreme Court would uphold
the law, what the outcome of the November 2012 elections would be, and whether
or not it wanted to retain policy autonomy.
In their article “Why States Expand Medicaid: Party, Resources, and History,”
Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) look for factors, beyond state party control, that
influence whether or not a state implements the Medicaid expansion. They
recognize that political party control does in fact play a role in determining whether
or not a state implements the Medicaid expansion; however, they also emphasize
that although Democrat-controlled states are more likely to embrace reform, there
several Republican states have also implemented or taken steps to implement the
reform. For this reason, Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) hypothesize that factors such
as state economic conditions, decision-making processes and outcomes toward
previous policies similar to Medicaid, and what states can do administratively may
also influence the decision.
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Jacobs and Callaghan (2013) measure Medicaid expansion implementation in
three ways. Their first form of measurement is gubernatorial statements, budgets,
or collective decisions of the governor indicating a Medicaid expansion. A state is
given 3 points if it expanded, -3 if it did not, and 0 if it failed to act. The second
measurement looks at state planning steps. For this measurement, the authors
tracked receipts of federal grants to the state. If a state received federal support, it
meant the state was seriously considering expanding. The authors measure
Medicaid expansion by examining changes in Medicaid policy that each state took in
2013. These changes included the expansion of benefits, changes in the application
and renewal process, and decreases in co-payments. State economic conditions
were measured using per capita state income. To measure the past policy decisions,
the authors tracked whether, and to what degree, past decisions expanded
healthcare to pregnant women, working parents, the medically needy, childless
adults, and more than 90 percent of children. Finally, administrative capacity
included looking at how well the state determined eligibility for its citizens, how
quickly it processed enrollments, how strict it was in confirming ensured payments
were made, and how well the it monitored the quality of care it provided through
Medicaid.
Using an OLS regression, the authors find that the states with the highest per
capita income are moving towards Medicaid expansion implementation, while those
with the lowest are not. Furthermore, they find that state decisions to move ahead
with implementation are well correlated with past policy decisions to increase
healthcare access. Finally, they find that states that have stronger administrative
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structures are further along in the implementation process than those with weaker
ones.
In addition to these studies regarding how ACA implementation differs under
Republicans and Democrats, a limited number of studies have also been completed
on how ACA implementation affects health insurance outcomes. In their article
“Implementing the Affordable Care Act Health Insurance Exchanges: State
Government Choices and Policy Outcomes,” Noh and Krane (2016) examine whether
the type of exchange that a state implements affects citizens decisions’ to enroll in
the exchange and whether health insurance premiums vary depending on which
level of government (federal, state, or a combination of both) administers the
exchange. Instead of coding exchanges as federally-facilitated, state-based, or
partnership, Noh and Krane (2016) code them based on which of the four core
functions of an exchange (eligibility and enrollment, plan management, consumer
assistance, and financial management) the state had implemented at the time of the
research. The more core functions a state chooses to implement, the more the statebased the exchange is. The authors use several dummy variables to measure state
involvement in exchanges. For one dummy variable, any states implementing all
four core exchanges are coded as one and the states implementing anything less are
coded as zero. For another dummy variable, states implementing the plan
management and consumer assistance functions are coded as one and any other
combination of the functions are coded as zero. Finally, a third dummy variable
defines one as equaling states that implement only the plan management function
and zero otherwise.
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To measure citizen enrollment in exchanges, the authors look at the
percentage of eligible individuals who obtained insurance through the exchanges in
the 2014 and 2015 enrollment periods, which is calculated using the proportion of
the number of enrolled persons in the exchanges divided by the number of eligible
individuals who could potentially obtain coverage through the exchanges. Noh and
Krane (2016) also measure state involvement based on whether or not a state
implements the Medicaid expansion component of the ACA; however, they do not
measure this decision with a simple yes or no answer. Instead, they measure the
Medicaid expansion using the percent of uninsured persons eligible for tax credits in
each state. In states that have not implemented the Medicaid expansion, tax credits
are available to citizens who fall between 100 and 400 percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL) and also purchase their insurance through the exchange the
state has chosen to implement. If the state has implemented the Medicaid
expansion, tax credits are only available to citizens who fall between 138 and 400
percent of the FPL and also purchase their insurance through the state’s exchange.
Citizens with an income between 100 and 138 percent of the FPL are covered by
Medicaid under the expansion, and, therefore, are not covered through exchange
plans that are subsidized by tax credits. Because of these policies, if a state has not
enacted the expansion, there will likely be more individuals who are eligible for tax
credits. Finally, the authors measure premium prices as the monthly silver and
bronze premiums for a 40-year-old non-smoker making $30,000 per year before tax
credits in 2014 and 2015 enrollment periods.
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Noh and Krane (2016) use an ordinary least squares regression model with
state exchange and Medicaid implementation as their independent variables, and
premiums and citizen enrollment as the dependent variables. They find that states
that implemented all four core functions of an exchange enrolled a higher percent of
eligible individuals than states that did not implement any of the core functions.
They found this conclusion to be the case in 2014, while there was no difference
between states that implemented all four core functions and those that do not in
2015. The authors attribute the 2015 results to the fact that states likely promoted
their exchanges when they were first implemented in 2014, but then did not do so
as much in 2015 once the exchanges had been in place for a year. Next, they find
that implementation of both the financial management and eligibility and
enrollment core functions influenced premium levels, but implementing any other
combination of functions did not. Finally, they conclude that the percentage of
individuals eligible for tax credits in 2014 and 2015 was positively associated with
increased enrollment; this relationship was statistically significant. This result
shows that state officials’ decisions on whether or not to expand Medicaid affect the
number of individuals eligible for tax credits, which further influences whether
citizens purchase insurance through the exchanges.
In their working paper “Impacts of the Affordable Care Act on Health
Insurance Coverage In Medicaid Expansion and Non-Expansion States,”
Courtemanche et al. (2016), also examine the ACA’s effect on insurance outcomes;
however, unlike Noh and Krane (2016), they focus on the Medicaid expansion
component of the law. They ask whether implementing the Medicaid expansion has
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an effect on state insurance rates. To investigate this, they use a difference-indifference-in-differences model to determine the effects of the ACA with and
without implementation of the Medicaid expansion during 2014, the first year it
could be enacted. In this type of model, the authors first look at states that
implemented the Medicaid expansion in 2014. Within these states, they look at the
change between pre-2014 and post-2014 rates in high uninsured areas versus in
low uninsured areas. Courtemanche et al. (2016) then examine non-Medicaid
expansion states, and again look at the difference between the pre and post
expansion year rates in high uninsured areas versus in low uninsured areas. Finally,
the authors compare the differences between these two groups of states. In the
model, the authors control for several state-level variables including demographic
characteristics, such as age, gender, and race, family structure, which includes
marital status and the number of children in a household, and economic
characteristics, such as education, household income, and unemployment rates.
They also include an interaction variable of the post-treatment dummy with an
indicator of whether a state set up a state-based exchange. Including this interactive
variable controls for the fact that the decision to expand Medicaid might be
correlated with other decisions that the state makes in regards to implementing the
ACA.
Using data from the 2014 American Community Survey and the Kaiser
Family Foundation, the authors find that implementing the Medicaid expansion
increased the insurance rate by 2.9 percentage points on its own. Implementing the
full ACA increased the proportion of residents with health insurance by 5.9
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percentage points. If a state did not implement the Medicaid expansion, the
insurance rate only increased by 3.0 percentage points. After running their main
difference-in-difference-in-differences regression, Courtemanche et al. (2016) run
several other regressions as robustness checks, which further confirm their results.
In their working paper “Premium Subsidies, the Mandate, and Medicaid
Expansion: Coverage Effects of the Affordable Care Act,” Frean, Gruber, and
Sommers (2016) examine how a variety of ACA policy provisions have each affected
insurance coverage rates. Similar to Courtemanche et al. (2016), the authors use
data from the American Community Survey and a difference-in-difference-indifferences estimation. Using this type of model allows the authors to examine the
effect of differences in the policy variables on changes in insurance rates over time.
Their model also includes area (in terms of public use microdata area (PUMA)),
year, and income fixed effects, which allows them to utilize the fact that individuals
are associated with different policy variables because of their incomes and where
they live. The four primary policy provisions the authors examine are new Medicaid
eligibility after ACA implementation, premium subsidy rates, the individual mandate
penalty, and pre-ACA and early expansion eligibility. New Medicaid eligibility after
ACA implementation is simply a measure of the proportion of people that gained
Medicaid eligibility after the ACA was implemented. Premium subsidy rate is equal
to one minus the percent subsidy (Net premium/unsubsidized premium) for each
health insurance unit (HIU). An HIU is defined as an adult, his or her spouse, and
their dependent children living in a household. The unsubsidized premium is
calculated based on the area the family resides in and is equal to the sum of
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individual premiums for each HIU member. Next, the individual mandate penalty is
equal to each family’s tax penalty in dollars due to the mandate. Finally, pre-ACA
and early expansion eligibility are defined as Medicaid eligibility before the ACA was
enacted and eligibility under pre-ACA expansions that occurred between 2011 and
2013 in some states, respectively.
The dataset includes data from 2012 to 2015, which allows the authors to
look at two years before and after ACA implementation. The authors estimate one
model where they include all of the independent policy variables for the years 2014
and 2015. In other words, there are eight policy variables in the regression.
Furthermore, the authors are able to measure the direct effects of each policy
variable in all four years of the study by interacting each of them with post-ACA year
fixed effects. Each policy variable is interacted with the year 2014 and then again
with the year 2015. The dependent variable, the uninsured rate, is measured as the
percent of each HIU without insurance at the time when the data was collected.
Demographic variables, such as age, race, marital status, citizenship, educational
attainment, number of children, and disability are also controlled for. The authors
run this regression for both Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states, allowing
them to compare the difference in Medicaid eligibility rates in high and low
Medicaid eligibility PUMAs for pre and post-2014 ACA implementation in both
expansion and non-expansion states.
The authors conclude that the Medicaid expansion component of the law has
the largest impact on increasing insurance coverage rates. They find that the ACA’s
new premium subsidies caused a 0.85 percentage point increase in coverage rates,
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and that individual mandate tax penalties did not have a significant effect. The
Medicaid expansion, however, caused a 1.0 percentage point increase in coverage,
with 0.44 percentage points of the increase being attributed to newly eligible
individuals joining the program. In other words, insurance coverage increased
more in states that enacted the Medicaid expansion than in those that did not.
In their article “Mortality and Access to Care Among Adults After State
Medicaid Expansions,” Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein (2012) not only examine how
implementing a pre-ACA Medicaid expansion affected health insurance outcomes,
but also health outcomes in three states: New York, Maine, and Arizona. The
authors choose these states because they all significantly expanded Medicaid
eligibility between 2000 and 2005. Before the ACA, Medicaid typically covered lowincome children, parents, disabled persons, and pregnant women. Each of these
states also expanded Medicaid to cover “childless adults,” which, again, are nondisabled adults without dependent children. In each of these states, the authors
observe adults between the ages of 20 and 64 five years before and after the
Medicaid expansions. Data comes from the Compressed Mortality file of the CDC
and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance system for the years 1997 to 2007.
The authors use a difference-in-differences regression with multiple
variables. The independent variable is the interaction between timing after the
Medicaid expansion and expansion state. Using an interaction variable and
difference-in-differences model allows them to compare the average difference in
the dependent variables five years before and after the Medicaid expansion was
enacted in each state. For the dependent variable, the authors use individual-level
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uninsured rates, rates of delayed care because of health insurance costs, and selfreported health statuses. As a control, Sommers, Baicker, and Epstein (2012) run
the same regression for three other states, which are non-pre-ACA Medicaid
expansion states with similar population sizes and demographics to the actual
Medicaid-expansion states being examined. New York was compared with
Pennsylvania, Maine with New Hampshire, and Arizona with Nevada and New
Mexico. The authors compare the change in the dependent variables in each of
these control states from before to after the year in which the Medicaid expansion
was enacted in the non-control state they are being compared to. Sommers, Baicker,
and Epstein (2012) then compare the results of these control regressions to the
results of the regressions that use the Medicaid-expansion states.
The authors find that expanding Medicaid decreases all-cause mortality,
especially for older adults, non-whites, and residents of poorer counties within the
states. Moreover, they find that Medicaid expansions increase Medicaid coverage by
2.2 percentage points, decrease uninsured rates by 3.2 percentage points, decrease
rates of delayed care because of costs by 2.9 percentage points, and increase selfreported health status of excellent or very good by 2.2 percentage points. Finally,
the authors explain that the overall uninsured rate might have decreased by more
than the Medicaid coverage rate increased because of spillover effects and the
timing of the Medicaid expansion. On one hand, publicity about the Medicaid
expansion might have encouraged uninsured, higher-income elderly persons to seek
insurance from other sources, for example, Medicare. On the other hand, they
hypothesize that the states examined chose to expand Medicaid when their
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economies were booming; economic prosperity can greatly improve both coverage
and the number of people who decide they want to obtain insurance.
In conclusion, some general trends can be drawn from the research
presented in this section. First, economic policy does tend to slightly differ
depending on which political party is in power. Second, state partisanship typically
affects how a state implements not only the Medicaid expansion and exchange
components of the ACA, but also healthcare policy in general. Finally, the way in
which the Medicaid expansion and exchange components of the ACA are
implemented often affects health insurance outcomes. Although all of the studies I
have reviewed in this section examine one of these topics, none of them link the
topics together and examine my central question, how does state executive and
legislative partisanship affect health insurance outcomes? In this sense, the
research I present in the following sections is both unique and slightly different
from research that has been completed in the past.

III. Data
For all of my regressions, I use a panel dataset that I have constructed. This
dataset includes data from 2010 to 2015 for all fifty states. I choose to use data from
2010 to 2015 so that I can examine each state before and after the Medicaid
expansion and state exchange components of the ACA were implemented in 2014.
Furthermore, using a panel dataset allows me to look at each state’s individual
characteristics in annual intervals from 2010 to 2015. To begin, for each state, I
have data on executive and legislative partisanship. Executive partisanship is
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simply whether the governor is a Democrat, Republican, or Independent. For
legislative partisanship, the data includes whether the entire legislature is
Democrat, Republican, or split. A split legislature means either that a different party
controls each chamber (house and senate), or one or both of the chambers
themselves are split with exactly half of the seats held by Democrats and half held
Republicans. It is important to note that in any regression that uses legislative
partisanship as one of its variables, Nebraska is dropped from the dataset because
its legislature is non-partisan.
Executive partisanship data comes from the National Governors Association,
which provides information on each state’s past and present governors, the length
of their time in office, and the party they affiliate with. The source of the legislative
partisanship data is the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). For each
year between 2009 and the present, the NCSL offers data on overall state legislative
control, along with data on state senate and house control. In addition to presenting
data on which party controls a state’s overall legislature, senate, and house, the
NCSL also offers information on the total number of state legislature seats, which is
further broken down into the total number of senate and total number of house
seats.
Next, my dataset includes data on how each state implemented the Medicaid
expansion and state exchange components of the ACA. Because these components
of the law were only enacted in 2014, my implementation data only includes the
years 2014 and 2015. For each state, I have data on whether or not it enacted the
Medicaid expansion (yes or no) in 2014 or decided to enact it in 2015. This data
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comes from “Obamacare Facts,” a website that provides information on the progress
each state has made in implementing the ACA, including whether or not it
implemented the Medicaid expansion and, if so, what year it was implemented in.
The “Obamacare Facts” website is published privately by an independent small
business called (dog) Media Solutions. The head author of (dog) Media Solutions,
and therefore head author of “Obamacare Facts,” is Tom DeMichele. “Obamacare
Facts” retrieves their data from healthcare.gov. For the state exchange component
of the law, the dataset includes data on the type of exchange each state implemented
(federally-facilitated, state-based, or partnership). This data is from the Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, a foundation that collects and provides data on anything
related to national health issues, including ACA implementation, health insurance
prices, and health outcomes. Their data on state exchanges includes annual statelevel information on what type of exchange the state enacted.
My dataset also includes a variety of health insurance outcomes for each
state. Four of these outcomes are the proportion of the population that is
uninsured, the proportion of the population covered by Medicaid, the proportion of
the population covered through an employer, and the proportion of the population
covered through a direct purchase (after 2014, this would be a direct purchase
made through the state’s exchange). All four of these outcomes are from the US
Census Bureau 1-year American Community Surveys. Each year, the US Census
Bureau puts out a survey on a variety of topics, including healthcare. When a person
fills out the survey, they are asked to indicate how they get their health insurance,
for example, if they are covered through Medicaid, an employer, or a direct
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purchase. The US Census Bureau then breaks down this information by year and
state and puts it into a chart, which is where the data I use comes from. In this chart,
the US Census Bureau also includes each state’s uninsured rate, which is the ratio of
the number uninsured people over the age of 19 to the total number of people over
the age of 19.
Besides examining how people are covered and the uninsured rate, my
health insurance outcomes data also includes a variety of state-level premium
prices. One of these premium prices is the average monthly family premium per
enrolled employee for employer-based health insurance. This data is from the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Unfortunately, it was only available from 2013
to 2015, but is nonetheless still useful because the time frame includes pre and postACA implementation years. The other two types of premium price data I include are
the monthly silver and bronze premiums for a 40 year-old non-smoker making
$30,000 per year before tax credits. Since these metal-tier plans were introduced
with the state-exchange component of the ACA, data for these two outcomes is only
from 2014 and 2015. The annual data is from the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation.
Finally, my dataset includes several control variables. Each of these variables
are used to control for factors other than partisanship that could affect ACA
implementation and also factors other than ACA implementation that could affect
health insurance outcomes. The first two controls are the proportion of the
population below the poverty level and the median household income. Both
variables are measures of state population income and are included as controls for
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two primary reasons. First, Medicaid is a program that provides insurance to the
poor. The greater the number of poor people living in a state, meaning the greater
the proportion of people below the poverty level and the lower the median
household income, the more likely the state is to implement the Medicaid expansion
because implementing the expansion allows it to more easily provide insurance to
such people. Second, both variables can also affect the uninsured rate. As the
proportion of poor people living in a state increases or the median household
income decreases, the uninsured rate might also increase because poor people will
have a harder time paying for insurance.
The proportion of people living below the poverty level data comes from the
US Census Bureau’s annual report (2011, 2013, 2015) on poverty. It was originally
collected through the 1-year American Community Surveys before being published
by the US Census Bureau. In the report, the data is organized in a table that gives
the poverty rate for each state for the current year of the report and the previous
year. Because each annual report includes data for the current and previous year, I
only use the 2015 (for 2014 and 2015 data), 2013 (for 2012 and 2013 data), and
2011 (for 2010 and 2011 data) reports in my data collection. The median
household income data comes from the US Census Bureau’s annual Household
Income reports and was originally collected through the 1-year American
Community Surveys. In each annual report, the US Census Bureau presents a table
with the median household income, in dollars, for each state for that year.
The next control I use is the proportion unemployed. This data is from the
US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is a fact-finding agency for
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the federal government that deals with labor statistics. For each year, the agency
offers a table with the unemployment rate for each state. I include this control
because the unemployment rate could affect several of my health insurance
outcomes. As the unemployment rate increases, it means that fewer people are
getting insurance through their employers, which decreases the proportion of
people covered through their employer, but could also increase the proportion of
people who are getting insurance through a direct purchase because they can no
longer get it through an employer. The unemployment rate could also affect the
uninsured rate. If an employed individual who solely obtains his insurance through
his employer suddenly becomes unemployed, he will no longer have employerbased insurance and may not have access to affordable insurance from another
source, leaving him uninsured. For this reason, the uninsured rate is bound to
increase when the unemployment rate increases.
Education may also affect a person’s knowledge of health insurance, which is
why I also include a variable that controls for a person’s education level. By the time
a person graduates high school, they should have acquired the knowledge to make
informed decisions about their medical needs, including what type of insurance best
suits and is affordable to them. Individuals who do not graduate high school may
not have such knowledge and therefore might not be able to make informed
decisions about where they should obtain their insurance from, what type of
insurance they need to suit their medical needs, and how much they should pay for
insurance. This education data is from the US Census Bureau American Fact Finder,
a fact finder that allows one to easily search through data provided by the US Census
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Bureau. The data was originally collected through the 1-year American Community
Surveys and is presented in yearly tables by state.
I also control for two health status variables that could affect how much a
person’s insurance costs. The first is the proportion of adults 18 and older that
smoke. I include this control because smoking can increase insurance premium
prices. In fact, the ACA permits that smokers can be charged up to 50 percent more
for their premiums than non-smokers (Obamacare Facts 2017). Paying the price of
a premium plus an additional 50 percent may make insurance unaffordable for
smokers, which would then decrease the quantity of insurance demanded by
smokers and, in turn, increase the uninsured rate. For the years 2013 to 2015, this
data is from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. For the years 2010 to 2012, it
comes from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The data the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation presents for 2013 to 2015 originally comes from
the CDC; the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation simply organizes and presents it in
tables. In other words, one could find the data from the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation on the CDC’s website, meaning that the data from both sources is
comparable, as it is essentially measured and collected the same way. The 2011 and
2012 data comes from the article “State-Specific Prevalence of Current Cigarette
Smoking and Smokeless Tobacco Use Among Adults Aged ≥ 18 Years- United States,
2011-2013.” This article includes a table that has the state-level data for both years.
The 2010 data comes from the 5-year report on tobacco control, “Tobacco Control
State Highlights 2010.” This report is split up by state and the smoking rate for
adults 18 and older for each state in 2010 is given.
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The second health status control is the proportion of adults 18 and older who
are obese (a body mass index of 30 or greater). I include this control because
obesity can increase health insurance premiums. According to the ACA, employers
can charge employees an extra 30 percent of the total cost of individual or family
coverage if they are obese (Ellin 2015). An increase in obesity could therefore
directly increase the average monthly family premium per employee for employerbased insurance. Obesity data is from “The State of Obesity,” a website run by the
Trust for America’s Health and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Data
presented by this website comes from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System, a state-level system of health survey data that is gathered through phone
surveys that are administered with the help of the CDC. The state-level data is
presented in annual tables.
My last control is the race composition of each state. My dataset includes the
proportion white, proportion African American, proportion American Indian/Alaska
native, proportion Asian, proportion two or more races, and proportion Hawaiian.
Since all of these categories together are equal to 100 percent, I drop proportion
Hawaiian in my regressions. This data is from the US Census Bureau American Fact
Finder, which presents the data in annual tables. One reason I include race
composition as a control is because racial proportions could affect spending on the
ACA. Tope and Hickman (2012) find that having a higher African American
population decreases spending on CHIP. Because CHIP is a similar program to the
ACA in that it is a federal program that gives state leaders control over
implementation decisions, greater proportions of African Americans could
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potentially decrease the amount of money states are willing to spend on the ACA.
Furthermore, politicians often hold racial biases, which means that they may be
more willing to fulfill the needs of certain racial groups of constituents than others.
Controlling for race proportions ensures that state leaders are not enacting certain
policies simply because enacting such policies will satisfy the group of constituents
they “favor.”
Another reason I control for state race proportions is because non-whites
have historically not had equal access to employment opportunities and as high
paying jobs as whites have. If non-whites hold low-wage, part time jobs, it is less
likely that they will be able to get insurance through their employer because such
jobs usually do not provide or provide limited access to employer-based insurance.
This means that as the proportion of non-whites increases, the proportion of people
who get their insurance through their employer will decrease (Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation 2013). Finally, according to the Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2/3 of uninsured African Americans and American Indians/Alaska
natives had incomes below the Medicaid expansion threshold of 138 percent of the
FPL before the ACA was enacted. This statistic could affect a state’s decision to
implement the expansion because if a state does not implement it, these groups of
people will likely continue to remain uninsured (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation
2013).
I present two tables below with descriptive statistics for each of my health
insurance outcome, partisanship, and implementation variables. Table 1 provides
the mean and standard deviations across all 50 states by year for each of my health
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insurance outcomes. As shown in the table, just over half of all people get insurance
through their employer. This proportion (approximately 0.55 to 0.56) is quite
constant from 2010 to 2015. The proportion of people who get their insurance
through a direct purchase is also rather constant from 2010 to 2015, only
fluctuating between 0.13 and 0.14. The uninsured rate fluctuates between 0.13 and
0.14 between 2010 and 2013, but then decreases to 0.11 in 2014 and then 0.09 in
2015. The uninsured rate likely drops in 2014 because this is the year when the
ACA was implemented. The proportion of people covered through Medicaid also
rises from a pre-ACA implementation value of approximately 0.17 to a post-ACA
implementation value of 0.19 for the same reason. The average monthly family
premium per employee for employer-based insurance gradually increases each year
from $15768.16 in 2013 to $17136.46 in 2015. Higher monthly silver premium
prices than bronze ones reflect the fact that the insurance company pays 70 percent
of an individual’s health care costs in a silver plan, whereas they only pay 60 percent
in a bronze plan.
Table 2 presents annual (from 2010 to 2015) information on my
partisanship and implementation variables, including how many states had each
type of governor (Democrat, Republican, or Independent), legislature (Democrat,
Republican, split), how many states implemented and did not implement the
Medicaid expansion, and how many states implemented each type of exchange
(federally-facilitated, state-based, or partnership). In 2014 when the Medicaid
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Table 1. Health Insurance Outcomes Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLE

YEAR
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Proportion
Uninsured

0.14
(0.0414)

0.14
(0.0419)

0.14
(0.0414)

0.13
(0.0386)

0.11
(0.0343)

0.09
(0.0313)

Proportion
Covered
Through
Medicaid

0.16
(0.0358)

0.17
(0.0358)

0.17
(0.0348)

0.17
(0.0356)

0.19
(0.0405)

0.19
(0.0457)

Proportion
Covered
Through
Employer

0.56
(0.0569)

0.56
(0.0580)

0.56
(0.0574)

0.55
(0.0561)

0.55
(0.0544)

0.56
(0.0536)

Proportion
Covered
Through
Direct
Purchase

0.134
(0.0253)

0.13
(0.0253)

0.13
(0.0238)

0.13
(0.0243)

0.13
(0.0257)

0.14
(0.0255)

Monthly Avg.
Fam.
Premium

_____

_____

_____

1314.01
(101.51)

1367.92
(91.33)

1428.04
(95.00)

Monthly
Silver
Premium

_____

_____

_____

_____

270.46
(61.41)

268.48
(67.10)

Monthly
Bronze
Premium

_____

_____

_____

_____

207.16
(52.21)

208.58
(54.73)

Notes: This table includes descriptive statistics for the following health insurance outcomes in my
dataset: proportion uninsured, proportion covered through Medicaid, proportion covered through
employer, average monthly family premium per employer for employee-based insurance, monthly
silver premium for 40 year-old non-smoker making $30,000 per year before tax credits, and monthly
bronze premium for 40 year-old non-smoker making $30,000 per year before tax credits. The mean
value of each variable across all 50 states is presented. Standard deviations for each variable across
all 50 states are in parentheses.

expansion and state exchange components of the ACA were first enacted, just under
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Table 2. Partisanship and Implementation Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLE

YEAR
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Democrat
Governor

26

20

20

19

21

18

Republican
Governor

24

29

29

30

28

31

Independent
Governor

0

1

1

1

1

1

Democrat
Legislature

27

16

15

19

19

11

Republican
Legislature

14

25

27

26

27

30

Split
Legislature

8

8

7

4

3

8

Medicaid
Expansion
Yes

_____

_____

_____

_____

24

27

Medicaid
Expansion
No

_____

_____

_____

_____

26

23

Federallyfacilitated

_____

_____

_____

_____

28

28

State-based

_____

_____

_____

_____

15

15

Partnership

_____

_____

_____

_____

7

7

Notes: This table includes descriptive statistics for the following variables in my dataset: governor,
legislature, Medicaid expansion, and exchange. Each state falls into one category for governor, one
category for legislature, one category for Medicaid expansion, and one category for exchange for each
year. Presented are the number of states that fall into each category.

half of the states (21) had Democrat governors, while the rest had Republican ones.
Nearly identically, 19 states had Democrat legislatures, while 27 had Republican
ones, and 3 had split ones. Medicaid expansion implementation was approximately
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evenly split with 24 states implementing and 26 choosing not to. Just over half of
the states (28) implemented a federally-facilitated exchange, while only 15
implemented a state-based one, and 7 implemented a partnership one.
The three states that changed from not implementing the Medicaid expansion in
2014 to implementing it in 2015 were Michigan, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.
Finally, the six states that changed executive partisanship between 2014 and 2015
were Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania,
while the nine that changed legislative partisanship were Colorado, Maine,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Washington, and West
Virginia.

IV. Methodology
The central question I attempt to answer in my research is: does state
executive and legislative partisanship affect health insurance outcomes? To begin,
partisanship can affect health insurance outcomes in at least one of two ways. It can
affect them directly or it can affect them indirectly through the way in which it
affects how the Medicaid expansion and exchange components of the ACA are
implemented. In order to determine whether the effect of partisanship on health
insurance outcomes comes directly or indirectly through implementation, I
complete a mediation analysis where implementation is the mediator variable. To
do this analysis, I first run a group of regressions that looks at the sum of the direct
and indirect effects of partisanship on health insurance outcomes, meaning that
implementation is not included as a variable. I call this set of regressions
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Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation). In order to
determine whether or not partisanship could affect health insurance outcomes
indirectly through implementation, I next run two regressions that break this
potential indirect effect into two parts. First, I look at how partisanship affects
implementation of the Medicaid expansion and exchange components of the ACA.
This group of equations, which I name Partisanship à Implementation, is
represented by arrow 1 in figure 1 below. I then look at how the implementation
affects health insurance outcomes. This group of equations is named
Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes and is represented by arrow 2 in
figure 1 below. Finally, I re-run the exact same equations that I run in my
Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation) group of
regressions, but this time do include implementation as an independent variable to
control for the effect that implementation might have on health insurance outcomes.
Running this last set of regressions, which I call Partisanship à Health Insurance
Outcomes (With Implementation) and are represented by arrow 3 in figure 1 below,
allows me to see whether partisanship has a direct effect on health insurance
outcomes once its indirect effect through implementation is controlled for. I will
either find that partisanship directly affects health insurance outcomes or that
partisanship only indirectly affects health insurance outcomes through the help of
arrows 1 and 2. I could also potentially find that partisanship neither affects health
insurance outcomes directly nor indirectly.
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Figure 1. Mediation Analysis

Implementation
1

Partisanship

2

Health Insurance
Outcomes

3

In each regression I run, the following controls are included: proportion of
people living below poverty, proportion unemployed, median household income,
proportion white, proportion black, proportion American Indian/Native Alaskan,
proportion Asian, proportion two or more races, proportion high school graduate or
higher, proportion of adults who smoke, and proportion of adults who are obese.
Instead of listing out each of these controls for each written-out regression
specification in this section, I define Zst as a vector of all of my controls. Although
each of my control variables are included in each regression I run, the control
variable results are not presented in my results section, but rather available from
the author upon request. Furthermore, I use the subscripts s and t on each of my
variables to denote state and time, respectively. Finally, it is important to note that
in all of my groups of regressions, except my Partisanship à Implementation group,
I cluster my standard errors by state to adjust for cluster-correlated errors within
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states. I will begin with my Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without
Implementation) group of regressions.

Equation 1:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!"
+ 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
*Note: The regression above is specified for partisanship = executive partisanship.
When looking at partisanship = legislative partisanship, I simply replace
DemocratGovernorst with DemocratLegislaturest.

I first run ten difference-in-differences regressions to examine the effect of
partisanship on health insurance outcomes. In these regressions, the
implementation mediator variable is not included, which means that the effect of
partisanship on health insurance outcomes is the sum of both direct effects and
indirect effects through implementation. Using a difference-in-differences
regression allows me to examine the change in each health insurance outcome from
before to after 2014 (the year both components of the ACA that I examine were
implemented) in states that had a Democrat governor (legislature) compared to
states that did not. My dependent variables are the following five health insurance
outcomes: the uninsured rate, proportion of people covered through Medicaid,
proportion covered through an employer, proportion covered through a direct
purchase, and average monthly family premium per employee for employer-based
insurance. I run one regression (equation 1) for each combination of my
partisanship and health insurance outcomes variables. This means that in one
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regression for each health insurance outcome, my independent variable is executive
partisanship and, in the other, it is legislative partisanship. For executive
partisanship, I use a dummy variable called DemocratGovernorst that is equal to one
if state s had a Democrat governor at time t and zero otherwise. Similarly, for
legislative partisanship, I use a dummy variable called DemocratLegislaturest that
equals one if state s had a Democrat legislature at time t and zero otherwise.
In order to use difference-in-differences equations and compare outcomes
from before to after 2014, I create a new variable, which I call postt. Postt is simply a
dummy variable for after 2014; if year t is 2014 or 2015, postt equals one and if year
t is 2010 to 2013, postt equals zero. In these difference-in-differences regressions,
postt is a variable of interest because its coefficient tells me how much each health
insurance outcome changed from before to after 2014 in states that had Republican
or Independent (split) governors (legislatures). I also interact postt with the
DemocratGovernorst (DemocratLegislaturest) to create a postt*DemocratGovernorst
(post*DemocratLegislaturest) variable. The coefficient on postt*DemocratGovernorst
(postt*DemocratLegislaturest) tells me how much more each health insurance
outcome changed from pre to post-2014 in states that had Democrat governors
(legislatures) than in those that did not. Interpreting the coefficients on each of
these variables allows me to compare the pre to post-2014 changes in each health
insurance outcome in states with Democrat governors (legislatures) to those with
Republican or Independent (split) ones. I will next move on to explaining my next
set of regressions, which I call Partisanship à Implementation.
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Equation 2:
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟! + 𝛽! 𝑍! + 𝜀!
*Note: The regression above is specified for partisanship = executive partisanship.
When looking at partisanship = legislative partisanship, I simply replace
DemocratGovernors with DemocratLegislatures.

My Partisanship à Implementation regressions determine whether there is
an effect of partisanship on the implementation of the Medicaid expansion and
exchange components of the ACA. For these regressions, I only use the year 2014
from my dataset because implementation decisions were only made once by each
state. In other words, implementation decisions were not made in 2014 and then
made again in 2015. Furthermore, this means that the variables in these
regressions only vary by state s and not time t. In these regressions, the
independent variable is partisanship and the dependent variable is implementation.
I run two regressions, following the format of equation 2, for each of the two
dependent variables (Medicaid expansion implementation and exchange
implementation). In one of the two regressions for each dependent variable,
executive partisanship is the independent variable. In the other two regressions for
each dependent variable, legislative partisanship is the independent variable. The
dummy variable DemocratGovernors is again used for executive partisanship and
the dummy variable DemocratLegislatures is again used for legislative partisanship.
When my implementation variable is the Medicaid expansion, I use a dummy
variable, called MedicaidExpansions. If the Medicaid expansion was implemented in
state s in 2014, the dummy variable equals one. Finally, because the state-exchange
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variable can be one of three categories (federally-facilitated, state-based, or
partnership), I am unable to use a simple dummy variable. Instead each category of
a state exchange takes a different value when state exchange implementation is the
dependent variable. 1 equals a federally-facilitated exchange, 2 equals partnership,
and 3 equals state-based.
For my Partisanship à Implementation regressions, I use probit and
multinomial probit equations. When the dependent variable is MedicaidExpansions,
I use a probit model because the dependent variable can only take one of two values.
Using a probit model allows me to estimate how partisanship changes the
probability that Medicaid will be expanded. My variables of interest in these
regressions are the partisanship dummy variables (DemocratGovernors and
DemocratLegislatures). Because I run a probit regression, I examine the average
marginal effects on DemocratGovernors (DemocratLegislatures). The average
marginal effects tell me how much having a Democrat governor (legislature)
changes the probability that Medicaid will be expanded. When the dependent
variable is exchange implementation, I must use a multinomial probit equation
because there are more than two possible categories that the dependent variable
can fall into. Using a multinomial probit model allows me to estimate how many
percentage points more likely a Democrat governor (legislature), compared to a
Republican or Independent (split) one, is to implement each type of exchange. My
variables of interest in these regressions are again DemocratGovernors and
DemocratLegislatures and, because I run a multinomial probit regression, I again
examine the average marginal effect on each one. The average marginal effects tell
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me how much having a Democrat governor (legislature) changes the probability
that each type of state exchange will be implemented.
Finally, I run one more probit equation (for implementation = Medicaid
expansion) and one more multinomial probit equation (for implementation =
exchange type) that follow the general form of equation 3 below.

Equation 3:
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟! + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒! + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!
+ 𝛽! 𝑍! + 𝜀!

For each of these equations, I include both executive and legislative partisanship in
one equation. I also drop Alaska from my dataset because it was the only state that
had an Independent governor in 2014. Because I drop Alaska, and therefore the
category of Independent governors from my dataset, I only include the
DemocratGovernors variable for executive partisanship in these equations.
Republican governor is the executive partisanship category I leave out and therefore
compare my Democrat governor results to. For legislative partisanship, I include
DemocratLegislatures and also SplitLegislatures. SplitLegislatures is a dummy
variable that equals one if a state had a split legislature (refer to data section for
how a split legislature is defined). Republican legislature is the legislative
partisanship category I leave out and therefore compare my Democrat and split
legislature results to. The next group of regressions I run are called my
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Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes regressions. Equations 4, 5, and 6
below are each part of this set of regressions.

Equation 4: For Implementation = Medicaid expansion:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!
+ 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
Equation 5: For Implementation = Federally-facilitated or state-based
exchange:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!
+𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
Equation 6: For Implementation = Medicaid expansion and federallyfacilitated or state-based exchange:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤!
+ 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤!
+𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"

In my Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes group of regressions, I
look at how the implementation of each of the two components of the law affects a
variety of health insurance outcomes. I run two regressions for each health
insurance outcome. In one regression, represented by equation 4, the independent
variable is the Medicaid expansion implementation. In the other regression,
represented by equation 5, the independent variables are a federally-facilitated
exchange and a state-based exchange. My omitted category is the partnership
exchange. For most of my health insurance outcomes, I use a difference-indifferences specification, which allows me to examine the change in the health
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insurance outcome from before to after 2014 (the year both components of the law
were implemented) in states that implemented the Medicaid expansion compared to
in states that did not implement it. Similarly, I am able to look at the change in the
health insurance outcome in states that implemented either federally-facilitated or
state-based exchange in 2014 compared to states that instead opted for a
partnership exchange.
In this set of regressions, I again use the postt variable that I used in
Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation) regressions.
Postt is a variable of interest in this Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes
set of regressions, as its estimated coefficient tells me how much health insurance
outcomes change from pre to post-2014 in states that do not enact the Medicaid
expansion (when implementation is the Medicaid expansion) and that do not enact
either a federally-facilitated or state-based exchange, meaning that they enact a
partnership exchange (when implementation is state exchange type). I also create a
new implementation variable, which I call ImplementationNews (for example
MedicaidExpansionNews) for each implementation variable. Similar to my
MedicaidExpansionst variable, my MedicaidExpansionNews variable is also a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the expansion is implemented and zero if it is not.
The difference between MedicaidExpansionst and MedicaidExpansionNews,
however, is that for MedicaidExpansionNews, I code each state’s Medicaid expansion
implementation from 2010 to 2015 based on its implementation in 2014 when the
law was enacted. This means that whether or not a state implements the Medicaid
expansion cannot change over time t. For example, if state s implemented the
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Medicaid expansion in 2014, the state is coded as an expansion state in every year t
from 2010 to 2015. There were only three states (Michigan, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania) that changed from not expanding in 2014 to expanding in 2015;
however, they are coded as non-expansion states in both years.
Similar to MedicaidExpansionNews, my new state exchange variables are also
dummy variables. For each type of exchange, the dummy variable is equal to one if
the state implemented that type of exchange and zero otherwise. For example, if a
state implemented a federally-facilitated exchange, the FederallyFacilitatedNews
variable is equal to one and if it implemented a state-based or partnership exchange,
the variable is equal to zero. Also similar to MedicaidExpansionNews, I code each
state’s exchange type for the years 2010 to 2015 based on the type of exchange it
implemented in 2014 when the law was enacted. This means that the type of
exchange a state implements does not change over time t. Unlike for
MedicaidExpansionNews, none of the states are miscoded because none of them
changed the type of state exchange they implemented between 2014 and 2015. I
create all of these new implementation variables and code them from 2010 to 2015
because in order to use a difference-in-differences model, I must have data for each
of my variables from before and after 2014. Furthermore, note that the subscript t
is no longer included on any ImplementationNews variables in the written-out
specifications because each of these variables is no longer changing over time.
I also interact my ImplementationNews variable (which ImplementationNews
variable I use depends on the regression) with my postt variable. The coefficient on
these interactive variables tells me how much more the health insurance outcome

60

changed from pre to post-2014 in states that implemented a Medicaid expansion,
federally-facilitated exchange, or state-based exchange than in those that did not.
Moreover, because the coefficient on my postt variable tells me how much pre to
post-2014 health insurance outcomes changed in states that did not implement the
Medicaid expansion (federally-facilitated or state-based exchange) and the
coefficient on my postt*MedicaidExpansionNews (postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews or
postt*StateBasedNews) tells me how much the pre to post-2014 health insurance
outcomes change in states that did implement the Medicaid expansion (federallyfacilitated or state-based exchange), I am able to compare pre to post-2014 changes
in the health insurance outcomes in each group of states.
Along with running one equation for each type of implementation variable, I
also run one equation (equation 6) that includes all three of my implementation
variables: MedicaidExpansionNews, FederallyFacilitatedNews, and StateBasedNews.
All three of these implementation variables interacted with post are also included in
the equation. Including all three implementation variables in one equation allows
me to control for the fact that the pre to post-2014 changes in health insurance
outcomes that I am seeing as a result of exchange implementation may be correlated
with the Medicaid expansion and vise versa. For example, in my equation that only
includes the FederallyFacilitatedNews and StateBasedNews variables, I might find a
significant estimated coefficient on the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews or
postt*StateBasedNews variable, but there is not a way for me to determine if this
significant coefficient is coming is coming only from the way in which the state
implemented the federally-facilitated or state-based exchange or if it could be
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coming from whether or not the state implemented the Medicaid expansion.
Including all three implementation variables in one equation allows me to control
for this.

Equation 7: For Implementation = Medicaid expansion:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
Equation 8: For Implementation = Federally-facilitated or state-based
exchange:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
Equation 9: For Implementation = Medicaid expansion and federallyfacilitated or state-based exchange:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!" + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑!"
+ 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"

There are two health insurance outcome variables for which there is no data
from before 2014 because these variables are only defined under the ACA. These
two variables are the monthly silver and bronze premiums for a 40 year-old nonsmoker making $30,000 per year before tax credits. Because I do not have data
from before 2014, there are not any pre-2014 outcomes to compare the post-2014
outcomes to, and I therefore cannot use a difference-in-differences estimation for
the two regressions that use these variables. Instead, I have to use an ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation, represented by equations 7 and 8 above. When
implementation is the Medicaid expansion, I once again use the MedicaidExpansionst
dummy variable that I used in my Partisanship à Implementation regressions. The
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estimated coefficient on this variable allows me to determine how much each
premium price changes when the Medicaid expansion is implemented compared to
when it is not. When implementation is a federally-facilitated or state-based
exchange (I omit partnership exchange), I use two dummy variables.
FederallyFaciliatedst equals one if state s implemented a federally-facilitated
exchange at time t and zero otherwise. StateBasedst equals one if state s
implemented a state-based exchange at time t and zero otherwise. The coefficient
on FederallyFacilitatedst tells me how much each premium price changes when a
federally-facilitated exchange is enacted compared to a partnership and the
coefficient on StateBasedst tells me how much each premium price changes when a
state-based exchange is enacted compared to a partnership one. Similar to my other
health insurance outcomes, I also run one equation for each monthly metal-tier
premium that includes all three implementation variables (equation 9).
Including my controls in these OLS regressions is especially important in
helping to reduce omitted variable bias. If I were to only examine the effect of
implementation on each of the premium prices, it would be extremely hard to
attribute changes in the premium prices solely to implementation. For example,
suppose that a state that implemented the Medicaid expansion also had a high
proportion of people living below the poverty line. Lower premium prices cannot
solely be attributed to the Medicaid expansion implementation in this case because
premium prices might have already been lower so that they could be more
affordable. Including these control variables in each OLS regression ensures that
anything that could affect either the monthly silver or bronze premium prices,
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besides ACA implementation, is controlled for and that I am not over estimating the
effect of either of my implementation variables on either of the two premium prices.
The OLS estimation is nearly identical to the difference-in-differences one, but does
not include the postt, ImplementationNews, or postt*ImplementationNews
variables.1 The final group of regressions I run are called my Partisanship à Health
Insurance Outcomes (With Implementation) regressions. Equations 10 and 11
below are part of this set of regressions.

Equation 10: When Implementation = Medicaid Expansion:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!
+ 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!"
+ 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
Equation 11: When Implementation = Federally-facilitated or State-based
Exchange:
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!"
= 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡!
+ 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤! + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑁𝑒𝑤!
+ 𝛽! 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟!" + 𝛽! 𝑍!" + 𝜀!"
*Note: Each regression above is specified for partisanship = executive partisanship.
When looking at partisanship = legislative partisanship, I simply replace
“DemocratGovernorst” with “DemocratLegislaturest.”

1

I also consider running my Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes regressions using state
fixed effects. Using state fixed effects allows me to control for characteristics of each state that could
affect health insurance outcomes, but are omitted from my specifications. Similar to reasons why I
have to run OLS regressions for the monthly silver and bronze premium prices, I choose not to use
my fixed effects regressions because I do not have enough data. Since the Medicaid expansion and
state exchanges were not implemented until 2014, the only data I am able to use for my fixed effects
regressions comes from 2014 and 2015. There is little variation within states between these two
years, which is why using a state fixed effects regression is not appropriate to use with the amount of
data I have.
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For this last group of regressions, I re-run nearly the same equations that I
used in my Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation)
group of regressions. The only difference is that I now examine how partisanship
affects health insurance outcomes using implementation as a mediator variable,
which means that equations 10 and 11 are essentially the same as equation 1, the
only difference being that they include implementation variables. Equation 10
(implementation = Medicaid expansion) includes the MedicaidExpansionNews and
Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews and equation 11 (implementation = state exchange)
includes the FederallyFacilitatedNews, Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews,
StateBasedNews, and Postt*StateBasedNews variables. Using implementation as a
mediator variable, and therefore controlling for implementation, allows me to
determine whether partisanship has a direct effect on pre to post-2014 changes in
health insurance outcomes, or whether the effect partisanship has is strictly coming
indirectly through its effect on the implementation of Medicaid expansion and
exchange components of the ACA. I run four difference-in-differences regressions
for each of the following five health insurance outcomes: proportion uninsured,
proportion covered through Medicaid, proportion covered through employer,
proportion covered through direct purchase, and average monthly family premium
per employee for employer-based health insurance. I use four regressions to allow
for each combination of partisanship and implementation variables.

V. Results
V. A. Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation) Results
65

As explained in the methodology section, the first group of regressions I run
examines the overall effect (sum of direct and indirect effects) partisanship has on
health insurance outcomes. I first use DemocratGovernorst for my partisanship
variable. In examining the estimated coefficients on the postt variables presented in
table 3, I find that the uninsured rate and proportion of people covered through an
employer decrease by 1.9 percentage points and 2.6 percentage points, respectively,
from pre to post-2014 in states that have a Republican or Independent governor.
Both of these results are highly significant with p-values of 0.000. I also find that the
proportion of people covered through Medicaid increases by 2.8 percentage points
and the average monthly family premium per employee for employer-based
insurance increases by 86.78 dollars from before to after 2014 in states that have a
Republican or Independent governor. Both of these results are also highly
significant with p-values of 0.000. None of the estimated coefficients on the
postt*DemocratGovernorst variables presented in table 3 are significant, which
means that having a Democrat governor does not significantly additionally affect the
changes in any of the five health insurance outcomes from pre to post-2014.
Although none of the estimated coefficients on my postt*DemocratGovernorst
variables are significant, it is important to note that the standard error on my
postt*DemocratGovernorst is 17.17 dollars when my health insurance outcome is the
average monthly family premium per employee for employer-based insurance. This
value is quite economically significant. Adding two times this standard error (2 *
17.14 dollars) to my estimate (11.89 dollars) gives me an upper-bound value of
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Table 3. Executive Partisanship and Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

DemocratGovernorst

-0.016**
(0.0073)

0.016**
(0.0076)

0.003
(0.0071)

0.002
(0.0038)

11.02
(26.45)

Postt

-0.019***
(0.0055)

0.028***
(0.0077)

-0.026***
(0.0059)

0.003
(0.0036)

86.78***
(12.93)

Postt*DemocratGovernorst

-0.004
(0.0071)

0.009
(0.0093)

-0.005
(0.0045)

-0.003
(0.0036)

11.89
(17.14)

0.652

0.371

0.773

0.511

0.589

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

46.17 dollars for a 95 percent confidence interval. Subtracting two times the
standard error (2*17.14 dollars) from my estimate gives me a lower-bound value of
-22.39 dollars for a 95 percent confidence interval. In other words, I can be 95
percent confident that the effect of a Democrat governor on the average monthly
family premium is not larger than 46.17 dollars and not smaller than -22.39 dollars,
but it could be anywhere within this range. I can be nearly certain that a Democrat
governor does not have an extremely large effect, but this confidence interval still
includes fairly large effects. Moreover, 0 dollars is included in the confidence
interval, which would mean that a Democrat governor could possibly not effect pre
to post-2014 changes in family premium prices at all. I cannot not determine the
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exact effect a Democrat governor actually has simply because I do not have enough
data. My data on this health insurance outcome only ranges from 2013 to 2015 and,
if I had more data, I might be able to get a better estimate of what the effect truly is.
For the two OLS regressions, neither of the estimated coefficients on my
DemocratGovernorst variable are significant. This means that controlling for all of
the control variables in vector Zst (refer back to methodology section for a list of
these variables), having a Democrat governor does not significantly change either
the monthly silver or monthly bronze premium price. These results are
summarized in table 4.
I next use DemocratLegislaturest as my partisanship variable. In examining
the estimated coefficients on the postt variables presented in table 5, I find similar
results to when the partisanship variable is DemocratGovernorst. I find the
uninsured rate and proportion of people who get their insurance through their
employer decrease by 1.8 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively, from pre to post2014 in states that have Republican or split legislatures. Both of these results are
significant with p-values of 0.004 and 0.000, respectively. The proportion of people
covered through Medicaid increases by 2.4 percentage points from pre to post2014, this result being significant with a p-value of 0.003. I also find that the
average monthly family premium per employee for employer-based health
insurance increases by 84.06 dollars from pre to post-2014 in states that have
Republican or split legislatures. This result is significant with a p-value of 0.000.
In contrast to my results where the partisanship variable is
DemocratGovernorst, I do find that two of my estimated coefficients for the
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Table 4. Executive Partisanship and Metal-Tier Premium Prices
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

DemocratGovernorst
R2
Sample Size

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Monthly Silver Premium

Monthly Bronze Premium

15.97
(14.81)

7.90
(12.69)

0.284

0.240

100

100

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

postt*DemocratLegislaturest are significant. I find that having a Democrat
legislature significantly additionally increases the proportion of people who get
their insurance through Medicaid by 1.7 percentage points. This result is highly
significant, as it yields a p-value of 0.003. I also find when the health insurance
outcome is the proportion of people who get their insurance through a direct
purchase, the estimated coefficient on postt*DemocratLegislaturest is also significant
with a p-value of 0.013; however, the sign on this estimated coefficient is negative,
whereas the coefficient on post for the proportion of people who get their insurance
through a direct purchase health insurance outcomes is positive. The sum of the
coefficients is not significant, meaning that having a Democrat legislature does not
additionally change the proportion of people who get their insurance through a
direct purchase from pre to post-2014. These results lead to the question of
whether the additional change in the proportion of people who are covered through
Medicaid from before to after 2014 is coming indirectly from a difference in the way
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Table 5. Legislative Partisanship and Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

DemocratLegislaturest

-0.021**
(0.0080)

0.027***
(0.0092)

0.003
(0.0074)

-0.002
(0.0052)

3.49
(30.16)

Postt

-0.018***
(0.0060)

0.024***
(0.0079)

-0.027***
(0.0062)

0.005
(0.0040)

84.06***
(13.69)

Postt*DemocratLegislaturest

-0.003
(0.0043)

0.017***
(0.0054)

-0.004
(0.0049)

-0.007**
(0.0027)

-4.46
(20.67)

0.660

0.433

0.772

0.495

0.579

294

294

294

294

147

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

Democrats versus Republicans or split legislatures implement either the Medicaid
expansion or state exchange components of the ACA, or if there is some other
difference between Democrats and Republican or split legislatures that leads to a
difference in these health insurance outcomes. Based on the fact that it is the
proportion of people who are covered through Medicaid that significantly
additionally increases when a Democrat legislature is in power versus when a
Republican or split one is, I hypothesize that this change is coming through the way
in which Democrat legislatures implement the Medicaid expansion. Historically,
Medicaid has been a liberal policy, so I hypothesize that Democrat legislatures are
more likely to favor and implement the expansion, which is why I am seeing an
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additional pre to post-2014 change in the proportion of people who are covered
through Medicaid under Democrat legislatures.
I do not find any other significant estimated coefficients on my
postt*DemocratLegislaturest variable which means that I find that having a
Democrat legislature does not significantly additionally change any of my other
health insurance outcomes from before to after 2014. It is important to note
however, that when the health insurance outcome is the average monthly family
premium, the standard error on the postt*DemocratLegislaturest variable is 20.67
dollars, which is quite economically significant. As described previously, I cannot
determine the exact effect a Democrat governor actually has on this price simply
because I have a small amount of data. I can be 95 percent confident, however, that
the effect falls within a range of -45.80 and 36.88 dollars.
For the two OLS regressions, neither of the estimated coefficients on my
DemocratLegislaturest variable are significant. This means that controlling for all of
the control variables in vector Zst (refer back to methodology section for a list of
these variables), having a Democrat legislature does not significantly change either
the monthly silver or monthly bronze premium price. These results are
summarized in table 6.
Given that I do not see a significant overall effect of partisanship on health
insurance outcomes in all of my regressions, but one, the next question I ask is does
this mean that partisanship does not directly or indirectly affect health insurance
outcomes at all? I hypothesize that partisanship does affect at least the
implementation of the Medicaid expansion component of the law and that

71

Table 6. Legislative Partisanship and Metal-Tier Premium Prices
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
DemocratLegislaturest
R2
Sample Size

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Monthly Silver Premium

Monthly Bronze Premium

4.75
(17.40)

7.69
(14.82)

0.276

0.240

98

98

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

implementation affects health insurance outcomes. If this is true, partisanship must
at least significantly indirectly be affecting health insurance outcomes through
implementation. I might not be seeing significant results in the group of regressions
above simply because the indirect effect of partisanship on outcomes through
implementation is too small to detect compared to other factors that affect health
insurance outcomes.

V. B. Partisanship à Implementation Results
For my probit regressions that use the Medicaid expansion as the dependent
variable and executive or legislative partisanship as the independent variables, my
results confirm my hypothesis that states under Democrat executive and legislative
control are more likely to implement the expansion. In examining the average
marginal effects on my DemocratGovernors and DemocratLegislatures,
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variables presented in table 7, I find that having a Democrat governor increases the
probability of a Medicaid expansion by 31.8 percentage points. This result is
significant, as the p-value equals 0.001. Having a Democrat legislature increases the
probability of a Medicaid expansion by an even greater amount, 49.8 percentage
points. This result is highly significant, with the p-value equaling 0.000. To confirm
the robustness of my probit regression results, I also run OLS regressions for each
independent variable. My OLS regressions yield the same results that I find with my
probit regressions: a Democrat governor (legislature) is more likely to implement
the Medicaid expansion than a Republican or Independent (split) governor
(legislature).2

Table 7. Partisanship and Medicaid Expansion Implementation
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

PARTISANSHIP =
DEMOCRAT GOVERNOR

PARTISANSHIP =
DEMOCRAT
LEGISLATURE

DemocratGovernors

0.318***
(0.0965)

_________

DemocratLegislatures

_________

0.498***
(0.0910)

0.460

0.611

100

98

Pseudo R2
Sample Size

Notes: This table presents marginal effects for each variable with standard errors in parentheses. ***
Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.
2

I also consider running both of these probit regressions using a one-year lag on the
DemocratGovernorst and DemocratLegislaturest variables because the Medicaid expansion was
implemented on January 1, 2014, which means that the 2013 governor or legislature decided what
policy would be implemented. After examining my data, however, I found that Virginia was the only
state that changed executive partisanship and also the only state that changed legislative
partisanship between 2013 and 2014. Because only one state changed executive and legislative
partisanship, using a partisanship lag would not significantly change my results.
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It is no surprise that Democrats are more likely to implement the Medicaid
expansion component of the law, as Medicaid is historically a liberal policy. Liberals
believe that every individual should have access to healthcare and nobody should be
crowded out or rejected from being able to obtain it. Moreover, they are willing to
use federal spending to help groups that are not as easily able to access it, such as
the poor, obtain it. This is why President Obama wanted and was willing to expand
Medicaid. Democrat governors and legislatures are more willing to expand
Medicaid than Republican ones for the same reasons.
Another explanation for why Democrat governors and legislatures are more
likely to enact the expansion could be because they do not want to go against a
policy that their most influential party leader, President Obama, designed and
strongly supported. If Democrat state leaders disagree with a Democrat president’s
policy, they may receive backlash from other party members and Democrat
constituents within their own states who expect them to uphold the policies of the
most influential party leader. Furthermore, if Democrat state leaders go against a
Democrat president’s and historically liberal policies, they may lose campaign
funding, donations, and votes from their constituents in the future. The same
explanation is true for Republicans that would choose to agree with a Democrat
president’s policy, a policy that does not align with typical conservative principles.
Both explanations I present for why Democrat governors and legislatures are more
likely to implement the Medicaid expansion are credible; however, I find the second
explanation to be more likely because politicians are usually looking to move up in
their respective parties. Especially when they start at the state level, politicians are
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always looking for ways to get re-elected and possibly even eventually move up to
the national party level. If Democrat state leaders go against a Democrat president’s
and historically liberal policies and do end up losing campaign funding and votes
from their constituents in the future, their ability to move up within their party
could be hampered. Independents are typically harder to judge than Democrats and
Republicans. There was only one state (Alaska) with an Independent governor at
the time the Medicaid expansion was enacted. Alaska chose not to implement the
Medicaid expansion, but since it was the only state with an Independent governor, I
am unable to draw any conclusions about how Independent governors choose to act.
It is also important to note that my regressions yield the results that a
Democrat legislature is even more likely to implement the Medicaid expansion than
a Democrat governor is. One reason for this result could be because state
legislatures are more knowledgeable about state budgets than governors are.
Governors are required to submit their budget proposals to the state legislature. In
order for the budget to be passed, the state legislature will review it, change it, and
then pass it, assuming the governor does not veto the changes it has made. Because
one of the state legislature’s main tasks is to deal with the budget, legislatures have
a better idea of how to divide up the state’s money than governors do (National
Governors Association 2015). Relating to the Medicaid expansion, a Medicaid
expansion does cost the state money and a legislature will have a better idea than
the governor of how much money the state has available and whether that money is
enough to implement the expansion.
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Similar to Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander (2013) I also find that a state’s
decision about which type of exchange to implement does not depend on its
executive partisanship. In contrast to these authors, however, I find that legislative
partisanship does have an effect on the implementation of the state exchange
component of the law. The average marginal effects on the DemocratGovernors
variable, presented in table 8 on the following page, first tell me that having a
Democrat governor does not significantly change the probability of the
implementation of a federally-facilitated, state-based, or partnership exchange.
Turning to look at the average marginal effects on the DemocratLegislatures
variable, I find that a Democrat legislature decreases the probability of a federallyfacilitated exchange by 38.6 percentage points and increases the probability of a
state-based exchange by 29.8 percentage points. These results are significant with
p-values of 0.001 and 0.000, respectively. Having a Democrat legislature does not
significantly affect the probability of a partnership exchange. One reason some of
my results are different than those of Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander (2013) could
be because these authors use pre-2014 preliminary data on what type of exchange
each state intended to implement, whereas I use post-2014 data, which is data on
which type of exchange each state actually implemented in 2014.
I conjecture that having a Democrat governor and Democrat legislature each
increase the likelihood of a state implementing a state-based exchange because
Democrats generally support the ACA, as it is a law that was introduced by a
Democrat president. The ACA calls for states to implement their own state
exchanges. If they choose not to, they can opt for a federally-facilitated or
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partnership one. Essentially, if a state implements a state-based exchange, it means
they are choosing to construct their own exchange where individuals and small
companies can shop for insurance coverage. In other words, they are choosing to

Table 8. Partisanship and Exchange Implementation
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Panel A.
Sample Size: 100
DemocratGovernors

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STATE EXCHANGE TYPE
Federally-facilitated

State-based

Partnership

-0.722
(0.6075)

0.134
(0.1271)

0.588
(0.6998)

Panel B.
Sample Size: 98
DemocratLegislatures

-0.386***
0.298***
0.088
(0.1206)
(0.0823)
(0.1154)
Notes: This table presents marginal effects for each variable with standard errors in parentheses.
Panel A represents the multinomial probit regression where the independent variable is executive
partisanship and Panel B represents the multinomial probit regression where the independent
variable is legislative partisanship. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request
from the author.

implement the law’s preferred type of exchange. As Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander
(2013) describe it, they are “giving into” implementing the law. Similarly, having a
Democrat governor and Democrat legislature each decrease the probability of a
federally-facilitated exchange because Democrats do support the ACA’s components
and are eager to implement the ACA and their own exchanges rather than waiting
for the federal government to come in and operate an exchange.
Only seven states implemented a partnership exchange: Arkansas, Delaware,
Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, and West Virginia. Arkansas had a
Democrat governor and Republican legislature, Delaware, Illinois, and West Virginia
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had both Democrat, Iowa had a Republican and split, Michigan had both Republican,
and New Hampshire had a Democrat and split. One reason states that had both a
Democrat governor and legislature could have implemented the partnership
exchange was because they did not have the government administrative capacity to
fully implement their own state-based exchange and needed assistance from the
federal government. This reasoning is similar to one of the factors Tope and
Hickman (2012) reference in their analysis of how states decided to implement
CHIP. Tope and Hickman (2012) conclude that states that are more bureaucratized
are better able to study and develop policy, therefore increasing CHIP funding. The
same could be true for the state exchange component of the ACA, which is why a
state that is not as administratively developed as others, but still under Democrat
executive and legislative control, might opt for a partnership exchange; they need
federal assistance, but would still prefer to implement and run at least part of their
own exchange.
States with different executive and legislative partisanships, such as
Arkansas, Iowa, and New Hampshire might have chosen to implement a partnership
exchange because the two branches of government could not agree on either the
federally-facilitated or state-based one. If Democrats are more likely to implement a
state-based and Republicans a federally-facilitated exchange, middle-ground is a
partnership exchange, as it is a hybrid of the two. Finally, one reason a fully
Republican state, such as Michigan, might have chosen to implement a partnership
exchange is because it did not want to “give into” the ACA and implement its own
exchange as the law calls for, but it still wanted to maintain some of its policy
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autonomy, as Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander (2012) hypothesize. Again,
implementing a partnership exchange is the middle ground between these two
options.
For my regressions that include executive and legislative partisanship
variables, I find that having a Democrat legislature instead of a Republican one
increases the probability of a Medicaid expansion by 49.8 percentage points. This
result is highly significant with a p-value of 0.000. Furthermore, I find that having a
Democrat governor instead of a Republican one and having a split legislature
instead of a Republican one does not significantly change the probability of a
Medicaid expansion. These results are summarized in table 9.

Table 9. Medicaid Expansion Implementation, Executive, and Legislative
Partisanship
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

PROBABILITY OF A MEDICAID
EXPANSION

DemocratGovernors

0.119
(0.0926)

DemocratLegislatures

0.498
(0.1301)

SplitLegislatures

0.142
(0.1084)

Pseudo R2

0.600

Sample Size

96

Notes: This table presents marginal effects for each variable with standard errors in parentheses. ***
Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.
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Turning to exchange implementation, having a Democrat governor decreases
the probability of a federally-facilitated exchange by 20.3 percentage points and
increases the probability of a partnership exchange by 12.9 percentage points.
These results are significant with p-values of 0.005 and 0.019, respectively. Having
a Democrat legislature decreases the probability of a federally-facilitated exchange
by 37.1 percentage points and increases the probability of a state-based exchange
by 26.4 percentage points. Both of these results are highly significant with p-values
of 0.000. Finally, having a split legislature decreases the probability of a federallyfacilitated exchange by 43.8 percentage points and increases the probability of a
state-based exchange by 37.5 percentage points. Both of these results are also
highly significant with p-values of 0.000. These results are summarized in table 10.

Table 10. Exchange Implementation, Executive, and Legislative Partisanship
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STATE EXCHANGE TYPE
Federally-facilitated

State-based

Partnership

DemocratGovernors

-0.203***
(0.0728)

0074
(0.0524)

0.129**
(0.0549)

DemocratLegislatures

-0.371***
(0.0771)

0.264***
(0.0630)

0.107
(0.0704)

SplitLegislatures

-0.438***
(0.1182)

0.375***
(0.0955)

0.063
(0.0708)

Sample Size
96
Notes: This table presents marginal effects for each variable with standard errors in parentheses. ***
Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent
level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

V. C. Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes Results
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In this set of regressions, I first run the regressions that use
MedicaidExpansionNews as my implementation (independent variable). By
examining the estimated coefficients on the postt and
postt*MedicaidExpansionNews, variables in table 11 below, I am first able to
conclude that the uninsured rate decreases by 1.2 percentage points from before to
after 2014 in non-expansion states. It decreases by an additional 1.2 percentage
points from pre to post-2014 in states that implement the expansion. These results
are significant with p-values of 0.016 and 0.005, respectively. I also find that the
proportion of people covered by Medicaid increases by 1.5 percentage points from
before to after 2014 in non-expansion states. It increases by an additional 2.9
percentage points from pre to post-2014 in states that implement the expansion.
Both of these results are significant with p-values of 0.044 and 0.000, respectively.
Finally, I find that the proportion of people covered through their employer
decreases by 2.6 percentage points from pre to post-2014 in non-expansion states.
It decreases by an additional 0.7 percentage points from pre to post-2014 in states
that implement the expansion. Both of these results are significant with p-values of
0.000 and 0.046, respectively.
Even in non-expansion states, one reason why the uninsured rate decreases
the proportion of people who get their insurance through Medicaid increases, and
the proportion of people who get their insurance through an employer decreases is
because of the individual mandate penalty established by the ACA. The individual
mandate states that all legal residents of the United States must obtain health
insurance. If a person does not obtain insurance, they receive a tax penalty (Frean
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Gruber, and Sommers 2016). In other words, more people will obtain insurance out
of the fear that they will receive a tax penalty if they do not, which in turn means
that the uninsured rate will decrease. Furthermore, before the individual mandate
was enacted, there might have been individuals who were eligible for Medicaid, but
did not enroll in the program because they were not required to have insurance.

Table 11. Medicaid Expansion Implementation and Health Insurance
Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.026***
(0.0075)

0.022**
(0.0101)

0.012
(0.0088)

0.003
(0.0063)

-28.73
(25.45)

Postt

-0.012**
(0.0048)

0.015**
(0.0071)

-0.026***
(0.0053)

0.006
(0.0036)

81.40***
(14.31)

Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.012***
(0.0042)

0.029***
(0.0043)

-0.007**
(0.0031)

-0.008***
(0.0024)

21.42
(16.17)

0.713

0.467

0.779

0.515

0.589

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Monthly
Avg.
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

Once the mandate was enacted, these individuals might have decided that they
wanted to obtain their Medicaid insurance in order to avoid the tax penalty, in turn
increasing the proportion of people covered through Medicaid. The proportion of
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people getting insurance through their employer might decrease because of the
increased demand for insurance through Medicaid.
Another explanation for the pre to post-2014 decrease in the uninsured rate
in non-expansion states could also be the newly ACA-implemented subsidized
premiums for private insurance purchased on the exchanges. If individuals realize
that they will be able to purchase insurance at a cheaper price, they will be more
likely to purchase it, which could decrease the uninsured rate. A final explanation
that applies to the pre to post-2014 non-expansion state increase in the proportion
of people covered through Medicaid could be a greater general awareness about
health insurance. When the ACA was passing through the White House, it received a
lot of publicity. Especially when the Medicaid expansion component of the law was
under debate and in the news, it is possible that there was a group of individuals
who did not realize they qualified for Medicaid and, because of a greater awareness
about health insurance, decided to investigate their eligibility and eventually enroll
in Medicaid, even if their state did not expand.
One explanation as to why the uninsured rate would decrease and
proportion of people covered through Medicaid increase even more in states that
implement the Medicaid expansion than in those that do not is because the Medicaid
expansion expands coverage to all those with incomes below 138 percent of the FPL.
Before the expansion, Medicaid only covered low-income children, elderly
individuals, pregnant women, disabled individuals, and some parents, but coverage
did not include some categories of adults, such as childless adults. Furthermore,
state Medicaid thresholds usually did not extend as far up as 138 percent of the
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poverty line (Wachino, Artiga, and Rudowitz 2014). By extending coverage to
incomes below 138 percent of the FPL and several new categories of adults, such as
childless adults, it is only inevitable that the uninsured rate will decrease and
proportion of people covered through Medicaid will increase in states that enact the
expansion more than in those that do not. In other words, expanding Medicaid
allows for a greater group of individuals to be covered, which is why the uninsured
rate decreases and proportion of people covered through Medicaid increases. The
Medicaid expansion also makes it easier for people to enroll in Medicaid, as the ACA
mandates that all states must allow for individuals to enroll in the program by
phone, email, or online, options that were not necessarily available in all states
before the expansion (Wachino, Artiga, and Rudowitz 2014). If individuals are more
easily able to enroll in the program, it means more people will choose to enroll, and
the uninsured rate will decrease and proportion of people covered through
Medicaid will increase.
I also find that the proportion of people who get their insurance through a
direct purchase increases by 0.6 percentage points (0.006 is the estimated
coefficient on the postt variable) in non-expansion states from pre to post-2014.
This result makes sense, as the proportion of people who are covered through a
direct purchase could have increased because of other aspects of the ACA, such as
the fact that each state had to establish some type of exchange where individuals
could purchase insurance. Having these newly established exchanges post-2014
likely made it easier for individuals to directly purchase insurance from providers,
therefore increasing the proportion of people who get their insurance through a
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direct purchase. Although the estimated coefficient on my postt variable is positive,
the estimated coefficient on the postt*MedicaidExpansionNews variable is -0.008.
This coefficient is negative with a bigger magnitude than the postt variable is
positive, which means that the proportion of people who get their insurance
through a direct purchase actually decreases by 0.1 percentage points in expansion
states from pre to post-2014. Although a decrease of 0.1 percentage points in the
proportion of people who get their insurance through a direct purchase in
expansion states is not significant (p-value = 0.588), this result does show that some
individuals who were getting their insurance through a direct purchase before the
expansion switched to obtaining their insurance through Medicaid once the
expansion was enacted. Many of these individuals were likely ones that did not
qualify for Medicaid before the expansion, but did qualify for it under the expansion,
causing their demand to obtain insurance through a direct purchase to decrease,
while increasing their demand for obtaining insurance through Medicaid. This
result is also consistent with my other result that Medicaid coverage increases more
than the uninsured rate decreases.
Although I do not find that implementing the Medicaid expansion has a
significant additional effect on the change in the average monthly family premium
per enrolled employee for employer-based health insurance, I do find that the
estimated coefficient on the postt variable is significant when the dependent
variable is this health insurance outcome. I find that the average monthly family
premium per enrolled employee for employer-based health insurance increases by
81.40 dollars from pre to post-2014. This result is highly significant with a p-value
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of 0.000. Although I do not find this estimated coefficient on my
postt*MedicaidExpansionNews variable to be significant when monthly average
premium per enrolled employee for employer-based health insurance is my
dependent variable, the standard error on this estimated coefficient is economically
significant at 16.17 dollars. As previously described, I cannot determine the exact
effect a Medicaid expansion actually has on this price simply because I have a small
amount of data. I can be 95 percent confident, however, that the effect falls between
-10.92 and 53.76 dollars.
In both of my OLS regressions, I find that the estimated coefficient on the
MedicaidExpansionst variable is not significant, which means that implementing a
Medicaid expansion does not significantly change monthly silver and bronze
premium prices when controlling for all of the variables in vector Zst. The estimated
coefficients on MedicaidExpansionst are presented in table 12 below.

Table 12. Medicaid Expansion Implementation and Metal-tier Premium Prices
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

MedicaidExpansionst
R2
Sample Size

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Monthly Silver Premium

Monthly Bronze Premium

-14.87
(21.40)

-7.01
(18.65)

0.283

0.239

100

100

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.
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In expansion states, people with low incomes are covered by Medicaid, which
means that people purchasing insurance through exchanges and insurance
providers are likely higher-income people who are more likely to be healthier
because they have an easier time affording health insurance when they are ill. If the
group of people purchasing insurance through providers in expansion states
becomes primarily high-income people who are generally healthier after the
expansion, providers can lower their premiums (meaning that the estimated
coefficients on the premium prices will be negative) because these high-income
people demanding insurance will need fewer health services. Because my estimated
coefficients are not significant, I cannot conclude whether or not this hypothesis is
in fact true. One reason I might not be seeing significant results is simply because
my sample size only contains two years, meaning that it is too small to yield any
significant results.
When my implementation variables are FederallyFacilitatedNews and
StateBasedNews, looking at the estimated coefficients on postt variables presented
in table 13 allow me to conclude the following results. First, from before to after
2014, the uninsured rate decreases by 2.0 percentage points in a state that does not
implement a federally-facilitated or state-based exchange, but rather implements a
partnership exchange. This result is significant, yielding a p-value of 0.011. I also
find that the proportion of people who get their insurance through Medicaid
increases by 3.5 percentage points from pre to post-2014 in a state that implements
a partnership exchange, this result being highly significant with a p-value of 0.002.
Third, the proportion of people who get their insurance through their employer
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significantly decreases by 3.0 percentage points from before to after 2014 in a state
that implements a partnership exchange (p-value = 0.000).
The coefficients on my post*FederallyFacilitatedNews variable when my
health insurance outcomes are the proportion of people covered through Medicaid
and the proportion of people covered through a direct purchase are both significant;
however, each of these coefficients has an opposite sign from the postt coefficient in
the same regression. For the proportion of people who get their insurance through
Medicaid, the coefficient on postt is 0.035 and the coefficient on
post*FederallyFacilitatedNews is -0.017. Adding these two coefficients together, the
proportion of people who get their insurance through Medicaid in a state that
implements a federally-facilitated exchange instead of a partnership one actually
additionally increases by 1.8 percentage points and this result is significant with a pvalue 0.008. The sum of the coefficients on postt and post*FederallyFacilitatedNews
is not significant, meaning that implementing a federally-facilitated exchange
instead of a partnership one does not significantly additionally change the
proportion of people who get their insurance through a direct purchase from pre to
post-2014. None of the estimated coefficients on the postt*StateBasedNews variable
are significant in any of these regressions. This means that implementing a statebased exchange instead of a partnership one does not significantly additionally
change the uninsured rate, the proportion of people covered through Medicaid, or
the proportion of people covered through their employer from pre to post-2014.
The significant results described above could be attributed to a variety of
explanations, one being the Medicaid expansion. The Medicaid expansion increases

88

the number of individuals eligible for Medicaid. Some of these newly-eligible
individuals might not have had insurance before the expansion because they could
not afford it. The expansion provides them with an affordable way to obtain
insurance and therefore decreases the overall uninsured rate and also increases the
proportion of people who get their insurance through Medicaid. Moreover, the
Medicaid expansion expands Medicaid coverage to more people, demand for
insurance through other sources, such as an employer, decreases.

Table 13. Exchange Implementation and Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

Monthly
Avg. Family
Premium

FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.014*
(0.0084)

-0.019**
(0.0089)

-0.009
(0.0108)

0.003
(0.0057)

14.76
(32.59)

StateBasedNews

-0.006
(0.0114)

-0.005
(0.0109)

-0.004
(0.0125)

0.016**
(0.0061)

48.00
(37.71)

Postt

-0.020**
(0.0077)

0.035***
(0.0106)

-0.030***
(0.0067)

-0.003
(0.0047)

105.18***
(21.66)

Postt
*FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.008
(0.0061)

-0.017*
(0.0089)

0.004
(0.0041)

0.007*
(0.0036)

-24.50
(21.40)

Postt*StateBasedNews

-0.006
(0.0077)

0.014
(0.0099)

-0.001
(0.0041)

-0.002
(0.0040)

6.98
(23.59)

0.671

0.421

0.775

0.542

0.605

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.
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I also find a significant result when my health insurance outcome is the
average monthly family premium per enrolled employee for employer-based health

Table 14. Exchange Implementation and Metal-tier Premium Prices
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Monthly Silver Premium

Monthly Bronze Premium

FederallyFacilitatedst

21.99
(20.42)

11.93
(19.61)

StateBasedst

-18.44
(26.01)

-27.84
(22.52)

0.317

0.291

100

100

R2
Sample Size

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

insurance. First, in interpreting the estimated coefficient on the postt variable, I can
conclude that the average monthly family premium per enrolled employee for
employer-based health insurance increases by 105.18 dollars from before to after
2014 in a state that implements a partnership exchange. This result is significant
with a p-value of 0.000. Neither the estimated coefficient on the
postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews nor the estimated coefficient on the
postt*StateBasedNews variable is significant in this regression, which means that
implementing a federally-facilitated or state-based exchange instead of a
partnership one does not additionally change the average monthly family premium
from pre to post-2014. It is worth noting, however, that the standard errors of the
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estimated coefficients on the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews and
postt*StateBasedNews variables are both quite large and economically significant at
21.40 and 23.59 dollars, respectively. As previously described, although I cannot
determine the exact effect of either type of exchange, having such large standard
deviations means there could potentially be negative effects, zero effects, or positive
effects. Finally, as summarized in table 14, I do not find any significant results when
my health insurance outcomes are the metal-tier premium prices.
When all three implementation variables are included in one regression, the
only significant coefficients that I find are on the postt*MedicaidExpansionNews
variable, as shown in table 15 below. I do not find any significant estimated
coefficients on either the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews or postt*StateBasedNews
variables in any of my regressions. When the health insurance outcome is the
uninsured rate, I find that implementing a Medicaid expansion additionally
decreases the uninsured rate by 0.7 percentage points. This result is moderately
significant with a 0.054 p-value. I also find that implementing a Medicaid expansion
increases the proportion of people covered through Medicaid by 1.9 percentage
points, this result being highly significant with a p-value of 0.000. Recalling my
previous results, when the health insurance outcome was proportion covered
through Medicaid and only FederallyFacilitatedNews and StateBasedNews were
included as implementation variables, there was a significant estimated coefficient
on the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews variable. Because I do not find any significant
coefficients on my postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews or postt*StateBasedNews
variables in this new regression with all three implementation variables, I can
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conclude that once I control for Medicaid expansion implementation, implementing
a federally-facilitated or state-based exchange instead of a partnership one does not
significantly additionally affect pre to post-2014 changes in any of my health
insurance outcomes. The estimated coefficient on postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews in
my regression with only the FederallyFacilitatedNews and StateExchangeNews was

Table 15. Medicaid Expansion Implementation, Exchange Implementation,
and Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

Monthly
Avg. Family
Premium

MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.025***
(0.0076)

0.020
(0.0155)

0.013
(0.0110)

-0.002
(0.0083)

-3.20
(26.68)

FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.000
(0.0085)

-0.008
(0.0139)

-0.001
(0.0122)

0.002
(0.0080)

13.22
(31.20)

StateBasedNews

-0.005
(0.0104)

-0.006
(0.0101)

-0.005
(0.0125)

0.016**
(0.0061)

47.99
(39.15)

Postt

-0.012
(0.0075)

0.017
(0.0111)

-0.027***
(0.0067)

-0.000
(0.0073)

107.31**
(24.91)

Postt
*MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.007*
(0.0036)

0.019***
(0.0032)

-0.006
(0.0043)

-0.003
(0.0043)

2.24
(18.16)

Postt
*FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.001
(0.0063)

-0.003
(0.0082)

0.001
(0.0045)

0.004
(0.0054)

-26.27
(21.25)

Postt*StateBasedNews

-0.009
(0.0079)

0.016
(0.0095)

-0.001
(0.0053)

-0.002
(0.0038)

6.74
(24.87)

0.718

0.479

0.779

0.544

0.605

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.
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likely significant because the results were correlated with the Medicaid expansion. I
also do not find any significant results when my health insurance outcomes are the
metal-tier premium prices, as shown in table 16 below.

Table 16. Medicaid Expansion Implementation, Exchange Implementation and
Metal-tier Premium Prices
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Monthly Silver Premium

Monthly Bronze Premium

MedicaidExpansionst

2.96
(28.21)

9.98
(22.36)

FederallyFacilitatedst

23.78
(27.29)

17.96
(22.79)

StateBasedst

-18.24
(25.77)

-27.20
(22.30)

0.317

0.295

100

100

R2
Sample Size

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

V. D. Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (With Implementation)
For my final group of regressions that examine how partisanship affects
health insurance outcomes, using implementation as a mediator variable, I find that
adding the MedicaidExpansionNews as the implementation variable in my
regressions does not drastically affect any of my previous results. The first change I
see is that in my regression where the health insurance outcome is the proportion of
people who get their insurance through a direct purchase, the partisanship variable
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is DemocratLegislaturest, and the implementation variable is
MedicaidExpansionNewst, the coefficient on postt is now significant, whereas it was
not in my Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation)
regressions. The other change I see is that for in my regressions where the health
insurance outcome is the proportion of people who get their insurance through an
employer, the implementation variable is MedicaidExpansionNewst, and
partisanship is either DemocratGovernorst or DemocratLegislaturest, the coefficient
on Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews is no longer significant, whereas it was in my
Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes regressions. The results for the
regressions where the implementation variable is MedicaidExpansionNews and the
partisanship variable is DemocratGovernorst are summarized in table 17 below and
the results for the regressions where the implementation variable is
MedicaidExpansionNews and the partisanship variable is DemocratLegislaturest are
summarized in table 18 below.
As shown in tables 17 and 18 I do not find significant estimated coefficients
on either my postt*DemocratGovernorst or postt*DemocratLegislaturest variables in
any of my regressions where MedicaidExpansionNews, is my implementation
variable. This allows me to conclude that when I control for the indirect effect
partisanship has on health insurance outcomes through Medicaid expansion
implementation, having a Democrat governor or a Democrat legislature does not
directly additionally affect pre to post-2014 changes in any of my health insurance
outcomes. Furthermore, because I control for Medicaid expansion implementation
and find that pre to post-2014 changes in health insurance outcomes are not coming
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directly from partisanship, it means the changes in the health insurance outcomes
must be coming through some other source. One example of another source that
these changes could be coming from would be exchange implementation. For
example, I am likely seeing a significant pre to post-2014 increase in the proportion

Table 17. Executive Partisanship, Medicaid Expansion Implementation, and
Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.023***
(0.0076)

0.018
(0.0108)

0.013
(0.0086)

0.002
(0.0070)

-45.47*
(23.64)

DemocratGovernorst

-0.008
(0.0070)

0.011
(0.0080)

-0.002
(0.0064)

0.001
(0.0044)

35.11
(25.77)

Postt

-0.013***
(0.0043)

0.016**
(0.0069)

-0.026***
(0.0053)

0.0056
(0.0038)

81.12***
(13.80)

Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.013**
(0.0052)

0.032***
(0.0054)

-0.006
(0.0044)

-0.009***
(0.0032)

30.51
(18.26)

Postt*DemocratGovernorst

0.001
(0.0073)

-0.005
(0.0078)

-0.001
(0.0064)

0.002
(0.0042)

-8.52
(18.94)

0.719

0.477

0.779

0.516

0.599

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

of people who get their insurance through a direct purchase and a significant
decrease in the proportion of people who get their insurance through their
employer because exchanges make it easier for individuals to obtain their insurance
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through a direct purchase. When demand for insurance through an exchange
increases, demand for insurance through other sources, such as employers,
decreases. No matter what is causing the pre to post-2014 changes in health
insurance outcomes, however, I can certainly be sure that it is not directly
partisanship.

Table 18. Legislative Partisanship, Medicaid Expansion Implementation, and
Health Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.021***
(0.0067)

0.010*
(0.0104)

0.015
(0.0101)

0.005
(0.0072)

-62.24**
(24.94)

DemocratLegislaturest

-0.010*
(0.0056)

0.023**
(0.0103)

-0.006
(0.0078)

-0.005
(0.0063)

48.88
(33.51)

Postt

-0.012**
(0.0067)

0.014*
(0.0074)

-0.026***
(0.0056)

0.006*
(0.0041)

78.30***
(14.30)

Postt*MedicaidExpansionNews

-0.016***
(0.0051)

0.032***
(0.0067)

-0.007
(0.0051)

-0.006*
(0.0035)

56.29
(26.32)

Postt*DemocratLegislaturest

0.006
(0.0054)

-0.003
(0.0074)

0.001
(0.0072)

-0.003
(0.0063)

-47.66
(30.77)

0.717

0.495

0.779

0.499

0.592

294

294

294

294

147

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

One other important note about these results is that, similar to in past results
sections, when my health insurance outcome is the average monthly family
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premium, the standard errors of the estimated coefficients on both my
postt*DemocratGovernorst variable and postt*DemocratLegislaturest variable are
quite high and economically significant at 18.94 and 30.77 dollars, respectively.
Although I cannot determine the exact effect a Democrat governor or Democrat
legislature because of limited data, I can be 95 percent confident it falls within 46.40 and 29.36 dollars when the partisanship variable is DemocratGovernorst and 109.20 and 13.88 dollars when the partisanship variable is DemocratLegislaturest.
Moving onto my regressions where the implementation variables are
FederallyFaciliatedNews and StateBasedNews, I again find that adding
FederallyFaciliatedNews and StateBasedNews to my Partisanship à Health
Insurance Outcomes regressions does not radically change any of my previous
results. I first see changes in the estimated coefficients on my postt variables when
the health insurance outcome is proportion covered through a direct purchase for
both the regression where my partisanship variable is DemocratGovernorst and the
regression where my partisanship variable is DemocratLegislaturest In my
Partisanship à Health Insurance Outcomes (Without Implementation) the
coefficients on postt for each of these regressions was positive, whereas it is now
negative. I also find that there are some slight differences on some of the
coefficients for the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews and postt*StateBasedNews
variables. In the regression where partisanship is DemocratGovernorst, and the
health insurance outcome is the average monthly family premium, the estimated
coefficient on postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews is significant, whereas it was not in my
Implementation à Health Insurance Outcomes regressions. Similarly, when the
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Table 19. Executive Partisanship, State Exchange Implementation, and Health
Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.007
(0.0094)

-0.011
(0.0113)

-0.009
(0.0107)

0.003
(0.0065)

48.82*
(27.23)

StateBasedNews

-0.008
(0.0110)

-0.003
(0.0102)

-0.004
(0.0127)

0.016***
(0.0059)

-44.42
(33.60)

DemocratGovernorst

-0.012
(0.0082)

0.013
(0.0094)

-0.000
(0.0069)

0.000
(0.0045)

54.39*
(25.70)

Postt

-0.024***
(0.0079)

0.041***
(0.0114)

-0.029***
(0.0077)

-0.005
(0.0053)

132.29***
(25.65)

Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.011
(0.0072)

-0.022**
(0.0094)

0.003
(0.0049)

0.008**
(0.0039)

-49.38**
(24.59)

Postt*StateBasedNews

-0.004
(0.0080)

0.013
(0.0110)

-0.000
(0.0049)

-0.003
(0.0044)

6.97
(23.88)

Postt*DemocratGovernorst

0.002
(0.0075)

-0.006
(0.0090)

-0.002
(0.0059)

0.003
(0.0044)

-29.31
(20.58)

0.682

0.434

0.775

0.543

0.620

300

300

300

300

150

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

partisanship variable is DemocratLegislaturest, and the health insurance outcomes
are proportion uninsured and proportion of people who get their insurance through
a direct purchase, the estimated coefficient on the postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews
variables are significant and not significant, respectively. In my Implementation à
Health Insurance Outcomes regressions, the estimated coefficients on these
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variables were not significant and significant, respectively. The results for the
regressions where the implementation variables are FederallyFacilitatedNews and
StateBasedNews and the partisanship variable is DemocratGovernorst are
summarized in table 19 above and the results for the regressions where the
implementation variables is FederallyFacilitatedNews and StateBasedNews and the
partisanship variable is DemocratLegislaturest are summarized in table 20 below.
My results do not yield significant estimated coefficients on the
postt*DemocratGovernorst or the postt*DemocratLegislaturest variables for any of
my health insurance outcomes. This allows me to conclude that once partisanship’s
indirect effect through federally-facilitated or state-exchange implementation is
controlled for, partisanship does not additionally directly affect pre to post-2014
changes in any of my health insurance outcomes. Pre to post-2014 changes in
health insurance outcomes are coming from other sources. One such source
perhaps could be the through advertisement of the ACA. When the ACA was first
implemented, it received a great deal of press and, especially in states that
supported it, a lot of advertisement. Advertisement and press relating to the ACA
could increase the public’s general knowledge about some of the law’s provisions,
such as the individual mandate. If people realize that they need to be insured in
order to prevent receiving a tax penalty, they will seek out ways to obtain insurance
either through Medicaid, a direct purchase on the exchange, or through an
employer, which could change pre to post-2014 health insurance outcomes, for
example, in this case decrease the overall uninsured rate.

99

Table 20. Legislative Partisanship, State Exchange Implementation, and Health
Insurance Outcomes
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

HEALTH INSURANCE OUTCOMES
Proportion
Uninsured

Proportion
Medicaid

Proportion
Employer

Proportion
Direct
Purchase

FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.005
(0.0090)

-0.005
(0.0128)

-0.009
(0.0116)

0.000
(0.0066)

33.57
(27.51)

StateBasedNews

-0.008
(0.0115)

-0.001
(0.0105)

-0.004
(0.0127)

0.015**
(0.0148)

-66.33*
(66.33)

DemocratLegislaturest

-0.017**
(0.0078)

0.027**
(0.0128)

-0.001
(0.0074)

-0.005
(0.0056)

53.60*
(30.46)

Postt

-0.026***
(0.0091)

0.039***
(0.0130)

-0.030***
(0.0073)

-0.002
(0.0058)

125.35***
(25.69)

Postt*FederallyFacilitatedNews

0.013*
(0.0072)

-0.023**
(0.0110)

0.004
(0.0043)

0.007
(0.0044)

-42.81
(25.76)

Postt*StateBasedNews

-0.004
(0.0089)

0.008
(0.0123)

-0.000
(0.0049)

-0.000
(0.0045)

30.23
(31.48)

Postt*DemocratLegislaturest

0.006
(0.0045)

0.001
(0.0077)

-0.001
(0.0056)

-0.003
(0.0039)

-53.94
(30.10)

0.687

0.474

0.774

0.529

0.610

294

294

294

294

147

R2
Sample Size

Avg.
Monthly
Family
Premium

Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients for each variable with standard errors in
parentheses. *** Significant at the one percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant
at the 10 percent level. Control variable results available upon request from the author.

VI. Conclusion
The motivating question I ask at the beginning of this study is how much
does economic policy differ when Republicans are in power versus when Democrats
are? Furthermore, how do these possible differing policies affect economic
outcomes? Using the ACA as my economic policy, I narrow this motivating question
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even further and ask, how does the executive and legislative partisanship of a state
affect how the state implements the Medicaid expansion and state exchange
components of the law and, as a result, constituents’ access to health insurance? To
answer my question, I complete a mediation analysis using state-level annual data
from 2010 to 2015. The central question I ask in my mediation analysis is does state
partisanship affect health insurance outcomes?
On one hand, I find that pre to post-2014 changes in the following health
insurance outcomes are not significantly different in states that have Democrat
governors compared to ones that have Republican or Independent governors:
proportion uninsured, proportion of people covered through an employer,
proportion of people covered through a direct purchase, average monthly family
premium for employee for employer-based health insurance, and the monthly silver
and bronze premiums for a 40 year-old non-smoker making $30,000 per year
before tax credits. The same result is true for states that have Democrat legislatures
compared to states that have Republican or split ones. On the other hand, pre to
post-2014 changes in the proportion of people covered through Medicaid do
significantly differ in states that have Democrat legislatures compared to in states
that have Republican or split ones. I find that having a Democrat legislature
increases the proportion of people covered through Medicaid by 1.7 percentage
points from pre to post-2014.
Even though I only find that partisanship has an effect on the pre to post2014 change in one health insurance outcome, I cannot prematurely conclude that
partisanship does not affect health insurance outcomes at all. I hypothesize that

101

partisanship affects ACA implementation, and that ACA implementation has an
effect on health insurance outcomes, which means that partisanship could indirectly
be affecting health insurance outcomes through implementation. To examine this
possible indirect effect more in depth, the next part of my mediation analysis
involves examining how partisanship affects ACA implementation. In this part of my
mediation analysis, I find that having a Democrat governor increases the probability
of a Medicaid expansion by 19.9 percentage points, the probability of a state-based
exchange by 11.9 percentage points, and the probability of a partnership exchange
by 14.0 percentage points. Having a Democrat governor decreases the probability
of a federally-facilitated exchange by 25.9 percentage points. Moreover, having a
Democrat legislature increases the probability of a Medicaid expansion by 51.6
percentage points, the probability of a state-based exchange by 18.7 percentage
points, and the probability of a partnership exchange by 15.6 percentage points.
Having a Democrat legislature decreases the probability of a federally-facilitated
exchange by 34.4 percentage points.
I then move on to examine how implementation of the two components of
the ACA affects health insurance outcomes. The pre to post-2014 change in the
uninsured rate was 1.2 percentage points higher in states that implemented the
Medicaid expansion compared to those that did not. I also find that the proportion
of people covered through Medicaid and the average monthly family premium per
employee for employer-based health insurance increased by 1.5 percentage points
and 1008.12 dollars, respectively, from pre to post-2014 in non-expansion states.
Implementing a Medicaid expansion additionally increased the proportion of people
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covered through Medicaid by 2.9 percentage points. The pre to post-2014 changes
in each of my health insurance outcomes were not significantly different when a
federally-facilitated or state-based exchange was implemented instead of a
partnership one.
To complete my mediation analysis, I re-run the exact same regressions I ran
when examining how partisanship affects health insurance outcomes, but this time
use implementation of the two components of the ACA as a mediator variables.
Doing this allows me to look at how implementation choices mediate the
relationship between partisanship and health insurance outcomes. When the
mediator variable is Medicaid expansion implementation, I find that pre to post2014 changes in each of my health insurance outcomes are not significantly
different in states that had a Democrat governor compared to states that had
Republican or Independent ones. I find the same results to be true when examining
legislative partisanship. I also find the same results when the mediator variables
are a federally-facilitated and state-based exchange. In other words, controlling for
implementation, pre to post-2014 changes in health insurance outcomes are not
significantly different in states that have a Democrat governor or legislature
compared to states that do not. From these results, I can conclude that partisanship
only has an indirect effect through implementation on health insurance outcomes.
This indirect effect can be separated into two parts. First, partisanship affects
whether or not the state expands Medicaid and which type of exchange the state
implements. Second, implementation then affects some health insurance outcomes,
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as described above, which means that partisanship is essentially affecting health
insurance outcomes through implementation decisions.
In conclusion, economic policy does differ when Republicans are in power
versus when Democrats are; however such differing policies do not always lead to
different economic outcomes under each party. During the time in which this
research was in progress, the partisanship of the president changed, leaving the
ACA’s future status uncertain. Because of this, it is hard to attribute my findings to
any future ACA policies; however, my findings do have policy implications beyond
the ACA. First, when the federal government enacts a law that is a federal law, but
allows states to have some control over how they choose to implement it, the federal
government must be aware that Republican and Democrat states will implement it
differently, just as they implemented the ACA differently. The federal government
cannot assume that states will enact the law exactly how it prefers, especially when
the state is controlled by a different partisanship than the presidency. Applying this
theory to other policies, in education policy, the federal government sets national
educational guidelines and provides federal funding to school districts that follow
such guidelines. Each state, however, is largely given control over whether or not it
wants to follow these guidelines, how it wants to operate public schools, what its
curriculum will be, and graduation requirements (Thomson Reuters 2017).
Although federal agencies, such as the Department of Education, can recommend
graduation thresholds and curriculum, there is no way for the federal government to
enforce that states will follow them. In other words, similar to the ACA, the federal
government must be aware that Republican and Democrat states will implement
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education policy differently, with states that are controlled by the same partisanship
as the presidency likely choosing to implement the federal guidelines. Moreover,
states that do and do not implement the federal guidelines might experience
differences in education levels, just as states that did and did not implement the
Medicaid expansion experienced differences in health insurance outcomes.
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